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This essay reviews the development of approaches within the comparative capitalisms 
(CC) literature and points to three theoretical innovations which, taken together, defi ne 
and distinguish these approaches as a group. First, national economies are character-
ized by distinct institutional confi gurations that generate a particular systemic “logic” 
of economic action. Second, the CC literature suggests a theory of comparative institu-
tional advantage in which different institutional arrangements have distinct strengths 
and weaknesses for different kinds of economic activity. Third, the literature has been 
interpreted to imply a theory of institutional path dependence. Behind these unifying 
characteristics of the literature, however, lie a variety of analytical frameworks and ty-
pologies of capitalism. This paper reviews and compares these different frameworks by 
highlighting the fundamental distinctions among them and drawing out their respec-
tive contributions and limitations in explaining economic performance and institu-
tional dynamics. The paper concludes that the way forward for this literature lies in de-
veloping a more dynamic view of individual institutions, the linkages between domains, 
and the role of politics and power.
Zusammenfassung
In diesem Discussion Paper werden Ansätze der Comparative-Capitalism-Diskussion 
vorgestellt. Sie haben drei theoretische Innovationen gemein. Erstens: Nationale Öko-
nomien werden durch institutionelle Konfi gurationen geprägt, die auf jeweils eigene 
„systemische Logiken“ wirtschaftlichen Handelns hinwirken. Zweitens: Die Compa-
rative-Capitalism-Literatur beinhaltet eine Theorie der komparativen institutionellen 
Vorteile, der zufolge institutionellen Konfi gurationen spezifi sche Wettbewerbsvorteile 
zugeordnet werden können. Zudem, drittens, beinhaltet die Comparative-Capitalism-
Literatur auch eine implizite Theorie der Pfadabhängigkeit. Trotz dieser Gemeinsam-
keiten unterscheiden sich die Ansätze hinsichtlich analytischer Zugriffe und Vorschläge 
zur Typologisierung nationaler Kapitalismen. Beim Vergleich dieser Ansätze werden be-
sonders deren Stärken und Schwächen bei der Analyse wirtschaftlicher Performanz und 
institutioneller Entwicklungsdynamiken hervorgehoben. Der Aufsatz kommt zu dem 
Schluss, dass die Comparative-Capitalism-Literatur in dreierlei Hinsicht der Weiter-
entwicklung bedarf: hinsichtlich einer dynamischeren Modellierung von Institutio nen, 
einem besseren Verständnis der Interaktion institutioneller Domänen und der Berück-
sichtigung von Macht und Politik in der Analyse von Produktionsregimen.
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Introduction
The notion of distinct national varieties or systems of capitalism has gained consider-
able currency in the last two decades. During the 1980s, signifi cant differences were 
noted between the excellent economic performance of Germany and Japan and the 
industrial decline of Britain and the United States. These differences were attributed 
by many to the distinct institutional arrangements of German and Japanese capital-
ism. The remarkable competitiveness of these ostensibly more “organized” economies, 
where the market played a lesser role, was seen in their ability to mobilize collective in-
puts and long-term commitments. Unlike in neoclassical economics, the emerging lit-
erature on institutional economics and economic sociology was coming to understand 
effi ciency in terms of strategic complementarities among organizational elements, 
which led to the argument that successful capitalism came in more than one variety 
(Milgrom / Roberts 1994; Sorge / Warner 1986; Aoki 1984). The demise of state socialism 
in Eastern Europe at the end of the 1980s intensifi ed the debate over whether capitalism 
is a single or variable type of economic system (Stark / Bruszt 1998) and whether Anglo-
American institutions provided the best model for transitional economies. This general 
debate took another major turn in the late 1990s, as potential virtues of market-led U.S. 
capitalism reasserted themselves in areas such as information technology (IT).
Even while capitalist diversity was being rediscovered and explored by scholars, 
economic globalization increasingly called the presumption of nationally distinct forms 
of capitalism into question. During much of the postwar period, the various institu-
tional domains of the economy were largely organized within the bounds of the nation 
state. Competition occurred in the form of industrial exports across these boundar-
ies. Today, mobile factors of production are less constrained by national boundaries 
and rules. This causes more competition among regimes with different institutional 
environments to provide conditions favorable to production. The task of coordinating 
transnational policy, performed most strikingly by the European Union, is becoming 
both an unavoidable and indispensable part of economic policy making. Consequently, 
a vigorous debate has emerged over whether globalization is leading to convergence on 
a single model of capitalism, or whether capitalism will retain nationally distinct colors 
and forms (Berger / Dore 1996).
Capitalist diversity is now being studied by an international academic community with 
eclectic backgrounds in political science and sociology, as well as Marxist and institu-
tional economics. The literature defi es a tightly unifi ed approach, but its authors share 
a common agenda of relating institutional variables with economic performance out-
comes. While regions and sectors are important units of analysis, this review will focus 
on debates over national forms of capitalism. Along with the “new comparative eco-
nomics” (Djankov et al. 2003), this literature is centrally concerned with the impact 
of differences in institutions on economic performance. But distinct from the “new 
comparative economics,” the literature draws upon various insights from economic 
sociology, such as the emphasis on the embeddedness of business fi rms within social 
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contexts and differences in the social organization and governance of fi rms in different 
economies.1 The comparative capitalisms literature is likewise distinguished by its focus 
on international comparison and a more synthetic understanding of political economy 
with regard to the complementarities between different sets of institutions.
This essay reviews the development of various approaches within what we call the com-
parative capitalisms (CC) literature and points to three theoretical innovations which, 
taken together, defi ne and distinguish these approaches as a group from other compara-
tive approaches to the study of the economy. First, national economies are character-
ized by distinct institutional conÞ gurations that generate a particular systemic “logic” 
of economic action.2 In particular, the CC literature offers an institutional theory of 
the supply side, examining how various institutions shape the collective supply of in-
puts (e.g., skills, capital) available to fi rms and other economic actors. Second, the CC 
literature suggests a theory of comparative institutional advantage in which different 
institutional arrangements have distinct strengths and weaknesses for different kinds of 
economic activity. This argument stresses the way in which institutional complemen-
tarities between functionally distinct domains (e.g., fi nance, labor markets) may lead 
to multiple, effi cient combinations of institutional variables. In short, the CC litera-
ture links an integrated study of political and institutional variables with a variety of 
distinct economic outcomes. Third, the CC literature has been interpreted to imply a 
theory of institutional path dependence. Contrary to notions of convergence on a single 
model of best practice, the literature emphasizes that common pressures may be re-
fracted through different sets of institutions, thus leading to different sorts of problems 
and calling forth distinct solutions. Given their institutional interdependence, national 
models will evolve in an incremental and path-dependent manner.
Behind these unifying characteristics of the CC literature, however, lies a variety of ana-
lytical frameworks and typologies of capitalism. Indeed, no agreement exists on the 
number of distinct types of capitalism, or on the dimensions used to characterize the 
various types of capitalism. This diversity of the literature refl ects the different ordering 
principle(s) used to compare capitalisms, the different institutional domains used in 
constructing typologies, and the particular concepts or dimensions used to describe in-
stitutions within a given domain. Perhaps less explicitly, different typologies also refl ect 
varying conceptions of institutions or, more precisely, different conceptions of how in-
stitutions constrain and relate to actor behavior. Taken together, the diverse approaches 
within the literature often suggest different theories and predictions about economic 
1 While the new comparative economics focuses on how institutions help secure property rights, 
the comparative capitalisms literature focuses on how institutions help economic actors solve 
various coordination problems, such as the way fi rms coordinate wages with labor or the terms 
of investment with providers of capital. This literature also looks beyond the market-versus-
state debate to other forms of economic “governance,” such as networks or self-governing as-
sociations (Dallago 2004).
2 “Logic” means the typical strategies, routine approaches to problems, and shared decision-mak-
ing rules that produce predictable patterns of behavior by actors within the system.
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and institutional change, as well as a distinct understanding of the sources of growth 
and economic dynamism present within each model.
These debates naturally lead to the question of which typology is “best.” Although there 
would be some advantages to establishing a more unifi ed typology of capitalism, it is 
unlikely and perhaps even undesirable on the whole. In this paper, we do not seek to 
unify these typologies, reduce them in number, or advance another typology of capital-
ism. Rather, we seek to review and compare these different typologies by highlighting 
the fundamental distinctions among them and drawing out their respective contribu-
tions and limitations. The early CC literature explored how institutions contribute to 
economic performance, but paid little attention to how institutions themselves are cre-
ated and change. The emphasis was on mapping the comparative statics of distinct and 
coherent national “models” wherein institutional elements are often seen as mutually 
reinforcing. However, the further development of comparative studies of capitalism 
depends on the ability to generate a more dynamic theory of institutional change. A 
comparison of the different comparative typologies of capitalism should help us better 
discern their respective abilities to understand, accommodate, and predict patterns of 
institutional change.
This paper is organized in four parts. Section 2 briefl y traces the intellectual anteced-
ents of the CC literature in earlier comparative studies. Section 3 selectively reviews a 
variety of more specialist comparative studies focused on particular institutional do-
mains and shows that these later came to constitute important building blocks of the 
CC literature. Section 4 reviews and analyzes some of the leading frameworks within 
the literature. Section 5 highlights the similarities and differences among typologies and 
presents criteria for evaluating the utility or advantage of different typologies within the 
literature. The paper concludes with a brief discussion of the challenges that need to be 
confronted in order to advance the CC literature.
Intellectual antecedents and alternative views of capitalism
The CC literature stands in obvious and stark contrast to the neoclassical understand-
ing of political economies, which denigrates the importance of nonmarket institutions 
(beyond those needed to sustain markets) or sees them as hindrances to the functioning 
of markets. In the neoclassical view, the price mechanism in competitive markets leads 
to the most effi cient outcome (with some minor exceptions). The state plays only a 
small role in correcting market failures. Moreover, if markets are unfettered, no impor-
tant institutional differences between national economies should exist, and they should 
converge in market organization and performance.
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Many early discussions over different types of capitalism were focused on the role of 
nonmarket institutions but were framed in terms of evolutionary stages; this was par-
ticularly true of Marxist and neo-Marxist approaches.3 These approaches emphasize 
a single logic of capitalism and stage-like historical evolution. In a famous example, 
Rudolf Hilferding (1910, 1924) argued that, as capitalism developed, concentration in-
creasingly displaced competitive markets. Over time, large industrial fi rms and banks 
dominated markets through their large size and the formation of cartels and trusts. 
During the interwar period, as the state became increasingly active as a regulator of the 
economy, and as concentration facilitated planned production in the private sector, the 
system evolved into “organized capitalism.”4 Another entire strand of Marxist theory, 
such as world systems theory, sees capitalism as a global system rather than discrete 
national capitalisms that may be linked through trade (Wallerstein 1979). Later ap-
proaches, including those in CC literature, increasingly distance themselves from such 
determinist historical conceptions (even though they are not ahistorical) and monistic 
theories of capitalism.
An important direct precursor to the CC literature was the modernization approach. An-
drew Shonfi eld’s seminal 1965 treatise, “Modern Capitalism,” perhaps best captures this 
tradition. In this work Shonfi eld elucidated the diverse national institutional confi gura-
tions that then existed and how these confi gurations represented distinct approaches to 
economic modernization. In each system Shonfi eld identifi ed the actors with the stra-
tegic capacity to guide modernization through planning and inducing desired invest-
ment behavior by economic actors. Shonfi eld was primarily concerned with the diverse 
ways state actors could intervene in their economies. How each state did this depended 
heavily on the particular institutional confi guration – in good part historically derived 
– of both state and economy. This emphasis on the state refl ected the general fact that 
the postwar era was characterized by historically high levels of state economic inter-
vention in the advanced capitalist economies. Shonfi eld’s work suggested convergence 
at a very broad level toward a political-economic model based on mixed public and 
private ownership, strong planning capacities, and the increased role of associationally 
organized capital and labor, though the specifi cs in each national case would vary sub-
stantially. In many ways, Shonfi eld represents an intellectual bridge between the prewar 
theories, which were dominated by the notion of stages of development, and the later 
CC approaches, which eschewed stages in favor of nationally distinctive models and 
trajectories.
3 However there were, to be sure, non-Marxist and nonteleological frameworks such as the one 
worked out by Gras ([1939]1971) who, in the 1930s, distinguished between petty, mercantile, 
industrial, fi nancial, and national capitalisms (the latter referring widely to fascism, Nazism, 
and the American New Deal as systems in which public capital comes to supplement private 
capital).
4 Organized capitalism, as conceived by early Marxists, was distinct from latter notions of “coor-
dinated capitalism”: the former term embodied a much broader conception of state-society co-
ordination in which national and class interests were given much consideration, and individual 
economic interests were restrained (Höpner 2003).
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There is also a long tradition of business studies, i.e., the study of the development of 
particular fi rms and industries, which has provided an important empirical basis for 
the CC literature. One of the most prominent scholars in this fi eld is Alfred Chandler, 
who chronicled the rise of major American corporations and their business organiza-
tion models, most notably the rise of integrated managerial hierarchy – what he called 
“managerial capitalism” (Chandler 1978, 1990). The emergence of stable and autarkic 
hierarchies in the United States was connected to the competitive nature of markets 
and extensive utilization of Fordist mass production. When comparing the U.S. to other 
nations, Chandler found a similar rise of corporate hierarchy but they were distinct in 
form and coupled with different approaches to production: In Germany fi rms tended to 
cooperate more extensively with each other (via cartels e.g.), hence he termed this “co-
operative managerial capitalism”; in Britain “personal capitalism” prevailed, refl ecting 
the prominent role still played by owner-industrialists. Chandler’s typology of capital-
ism based on different forms of corporate hierarchy and the organization of production 
complemented the modernization approach’s emphasis on the role of the state.
Michael Porter, in “The Competitive Advantage of Nations” (1990), brought business 
studies and modernization approaches much closer together – and thus closer to the 
present CC literature. In this multi-nation study, Porter observed that nations tended to 
excel in certain industries over long periods of time, based on competitive advantages 
rooted in accumulated institutional capacities that were embedded in technology and 
production skills. Increased global trade only reinforced such advantages. Porter also 
stressed the key role of the fi nancial system in determining broader industrial capaci-
ties. In particular, he advanced the argument that nations with fi nancial systems domi-
nated by securities markets excelled at funding and promoting radical technological 
innovation because they were able to provide risk capital. Conversely, bank-dominated 
fi nancial systems supported better long-term investment and investment in “intangible 
assets” (assets not easily priced by the market) such as research and development efforts 
or employee training. Porter’s ideas are echoed quite clearly in many CC typologies 
that emphasize the importance of fi nance and the idea that different national institu-
tional confi gurations support certain kinds of economic activity (production) better 
than others.
Institutions were also central to the 1970s neo-corporatism literature that emerged to ex-
plain the divergent responses and capacities of different nations in managing the grow-
ing problems of infl ation and unemployment (Berger 1981; Schmitter / Lehmbruch 
1979; Goldthorpe 1984). Whereas prior comparative approaches tended to emphasize 
the key role of the state, hierarchies, the organization of production, fi nancial insti-
tutions, and control over investment, this body of literature placed trade unions and 
collective wage-bargaining institutions at the center of analysis. It documented and ex-
plored a widespread (but not universal) trend toward the inclusion of labor and capital 
into the formation and implementation of economic policy. Most of this literature sug-
gested that nations with a strong neo-corporatist capacity were better able to manage 
the problems of infl ation and unemployment (Goldthorpe 1984; Kurzer 1993; Scharpf 
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1987). Institutions were central to this analysis because neo-corporatism worked only 
when there was a prior institutional basis for effective collective action in the form of 
peak associations. Later work showed the importance of central banks and an accom-
modating monetary policy in making neo-corporatist bargaining successful (Scharpf 
1988), and the importance of the party system as well (Katzenstein 1985). The neo-cor-
poratist emphasis on the structure and nature of a nation’s labor movement and collec-
tive bargaining system provided the CC literature with an initial understanding of how 
the industrial relations system interacts with other institutional features of a national 
political economy.
Moving from the macro-focus of neo-corporatism, French “regulation theory” cre-
atively linked the roles of macro- and micro-level labor institutions. Regulation theory 
was rooted in Marxism but shifted away from a conception of capitalist development 
as a progression of stages to a conception of “varieties” of capitalism. The theory ambi-
tiously aimed to replace a theory of general equilibrium with a theory of social regula-
tion over capitalism (Aglietta 1979). While capitalism is defi ned by the accumulation 
of capital, the social relations of capitalism may take many institutional forms. Unlike 
the principle of a single equilibrium, different modes of regulation, such as Taylorism 
or Fordism, give rise to different cyclical or structural crises. Robert Boyer was perhaps 
most infl uential in turning regulation theory into a tool of comparative analysis by 
using it to examine the institutional components of the wage / labor nexus at the mi-
cro-level – the organization of work, stratifi cation of skills, mobility of workers within 
and between fi rms, principles of wage formation and disposal of wage income (Boyer 
1988). Boyer further demonstrated great national diversity in the institutional forms of 
the wage–labor relation at the macro-level – the relations between unions, employers, 
and the state; the patterns of collective bargaining and wage formation; the use of social 
security, etc. As its empirical scope broadened, regulation theory made excellent contri-
butions to the study of macroeconomic performance and forms of labor organization 
(Boyer 1997, 1988, 2003; Boyer / Yamada 2000).
One fi nal predecessor was the so-called “societal effect” approach, associated with the 
Laboratoire d’Economie et de Sociologie du Travail (LEST) in Aix-en-Provence, that 
compared micro-aspects of work organization, primarily in France, Germany, and 
the United Kingdom (Maurice / Sellier / Silvestre 1986; Sorge / Warner 1986). The basic 
method was a matched-pairs comparison of particular factories, not unlike Ronald 
Dore’s groundbreaking “British Factory, Japanese Factory,” (1973) with the intent 
of isolating those shop-fl oor differences attributable to societal differences and then 
linking these closely with an analysis of various social institutions in the respective 
countries. Here fi rms were compared in relation with their social contexts, conceived 
and compared in terms of several interrelated sets of institutions: organization, skill 
formation, industry structure, industrial relations, and innovation (Sorge 1999). The 
methodological sophistication of these studies has been underappreciated, but they ac-
tually set the stage for truly “holistic” comparisons that understood institutional settings 
as systemic confi gurations rather than isolated attributes – a cornerstone of the CC lit-
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erature. These differences in societal contexts of work organization were also related to 
distinct business strategies and competitive strengths (Sorge 1991).
Finally, the popular comparison of distinct types of capitalism owes considerable debt 
to Michel Albert’s book, “Capitalism vs. Capitalism” (Albert 1993). Albert described 
two broad types of capitalism: a Rhineland type and an Anglo-Saxon type. Albert’s tour 
de force covers a stunning array of differences in the way private economic activity 
is organized. The recurrent theme is the Anglo-Saxon preference for “keeping options 
open” and allowing for short-term market fl exibility in contrast to the sticky commit-
ments and long-term thinking in the Rhineland model. Despite the author’s insightful 
discussion of corporate organization, fi nance, and the insurance sector, Albert’s aim was 
policy-oriented and polemical. He was not proposing an integrated framework with 
which to compare different types of economies.
Varieties of capitalism: the building blocks
These antecedents point to three analytical premises that inform and unify the diverse 
analytical frameworks within the CC literature. First, following Max Weber (1978), eco-
nomic action is viewed as a special case of social action that “needs to be coordinated or 
governed by institutional arrangements” (Hollingsworth / Schmitter / Streeck 1994: 4). 
The concept of “embeddedness” from economic sociology stresses that economic action 
takes place within social contexts and is mediated by institutional settings (Granovet-
ter 1985; DiMaggio / Powell 1991; Streeck 1997).5 Hence, the agenda goes beyond the 
comparison of state economic policies and formal institutions to examine differences 
in the social organization of private economic activity. A corollary is recognizing that 
markets and hierarchies (Williamson 1975) are not the only coordination (governance) 
mechanisms for economic behavior: Other mechanisms include social networks (Pow-
ell 1991), associations (Streeck / Schmitter 1985), and state intervention.
Second, the CC literature adopts a comparative approach that focuses on similarities and 
differences between institutions and governance mechanisms. The central research task 
is to understand the impact of institutional differences on various economic outcomes 
(e.g., growth, effi ciency, innovation). Most studies focus on institutional diversity at 
the national level (or families of nations), although this complements similar research 
comparing regional and sectoral variation of institutional arrangements (Herrigel 1996; 
Hollingsworth / Schmitter / Streeck 1994).
5 Wolfgang Streeck (2001: 2) describes an economy as socially embedded “… insofar as the trans-
actions by which it is made up are either supposed to serve also other than economic purposes 
(in other words, are constrained by non-economic objectives, such as social cohesion or nation-
al defense), or are supported by non-economic social ties (i.e., are facilitated by particularistic 
relations such as tribalism or paternalism, or by enforceable social obligations, engendering 
trust among economic actors).” 
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Third, the CC literature conceptualizes these various institutions within an economy 
as being interdependent. An attempt is made to develop a synthetic understanding of 
how different domains of the economy relate to one another and give rise to specifi c, 
non-random confi gurations of capitalism. Key concepts for understanding interde-
pendence include institutional linkages, tensions, and complementarities (Aoki 2001; 
Milgrom / Roberts 1995). Complementarity may be defi ned as situations where the dif-
ference in utility between two alternative institutions U(x’) – U(x”) increases for all 
actors in the domain X, when z’ rather than z” prevails in domain Z, and vice-versa. 
If conditions known as “supermodularity” exist, then x’ and z’ (as well as x” and z”) 
complement each other and constitute alternative equilibrium combinations (Aoki 
2001; Milgrom / Roberts 1990). Complementarities therefore do not imply economic 
effi ciency in any absolute sense and may even help to explain why suboptimal organi-
zational arrangements are sustained. In short, complementarities imply a functional in-
terdependence so that institutions in different domains affect the outcomes or utility of 
institutions across different domains. Such interdependence may also involve tensions 
when institutions imply confl icting principles of rationality (Lepsius 1990).6 Tensions 
may have destabilizing or adverse economic effects, but may also serve positive eco-
nomic functions by creating space for diverse organizational patterns and maintaining 
requisite variety for future adaptation in a population of fi rms (Stark 2001).
In sum, the CC literature looks at economic activity as being socially embedded within 
institutional contexts and compares these contexts across different scales, such as sectors, 
regions and especially nations. Institutions are seen as creating a particular contextual 
“logic” or rationality of economic action (Biggart 1991) or exerting a “societal effect” 
on economic organization (Maurice / Sellier / Silvestre 1986). This confi gurational ap-
proach and holistic type of comparison are central features of the CC literature. Yet 
much debate remains, such as over the extent to which various institutions are tightly 
or loosely coupled in a causal sense (Roberts 2004). In general, institutional interde-
pendence, along with social embeddedness, is seen as a major source of institutional 
stability in national systems.
The building blocks
Before turning to the synthetic comparisons of national models of capitalism, this sec-
tion reviews the building blocks of the CC literature, namely comparative studies deal-
ing with particular domains of economic activity: fi nancial systems, corporate gover-
nance, inter-fi rm relations, industrial relations, skill creation, work organization, welfare 
states, and innovation systems. By necessity, the scope of this review is highly selective 
and draws only on works with relatively broad comparative scope or theoretical depth. 
6 That is, complementarities must not be equated with similar principles of organization (Crouch 
2005).
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These studies examine how social and political variables infl uence the economic func-
tioning and performance across countries within these domains.
An important theoretical point is that the CC literature does not have established criteria 
for dividing an economy into a fi xed number of institutional domains. Nor do the vari-
ous frameworks within this approach necessarily agree on the defi ning logic within each 
domain, on the institutional mechanisms considered most important in each domain, 
or on the domains that have to be included when constructing a typology of capitalism. 
Indeed, the diversity and complexity of various typologies of capitalism refl ects in part 
the fact that they are “typologies of typologies,” i.e., national or “grand” typologies are 
assemblages (syntheses) of institutional domain typologies. Even if scholars agree on 
which domains to include, different typologies may still be used to describe relation-
ships within those domains and thereby generate different national typologies.
Financial systems
Financial systems channel household savings into investment in the productive sector. 
There are two basic channels between savers and investors (borrowers); the fi rst channel 
is mediated by institutions (usually banks) that aggregate savings, match the maturities 
of savings and investment in order to minimize liquidity risks, and evaluate and moni-
tor investment risks. The second channel is a direct transfer from savers to borrowers 
via securities markets. Economic historians have long noted international differences in 
Figure 1 Selected institutional domains in capitalist economies
Institutional domain Representative typology Selected examples of performance effects
Financial systems Bank- / market-based Investment pattern; corporate governance
Corporate governance Insider / outsider or sharehold-
er / stakeholder
Firm strategy; income distribution; skills; 
investment; innovation
Inter-fi rm relations Arm‘s length relation / 
obligational relation
Cooperation and competition; 
corporate governance; innovation 
Industrial relations Confl ictarian / pluralist / 
corporatist
Internal vs. external labor market 
fl exibility; wage levels; unemployment
Skill creation State / associations / market / fi rms Income distribution; work organization; 
innovation; industrial relations; fi rm 
strategy
Work organization Fordism / fl exible specializa-
tion / diversifi ed quality produc-
tion
Business strategy; industrial relations
Welfare states Liberal / conservative / social 
democratic
Labor market participation; patterns 
of savings and investment; organization 
of labor unions
Innovation Radical / incremental Work organization; business strategy; 
employment
14 MPIfG Discussion Paper 06 / 2
the relative roles played by banks and securities markets in fi nancing industrialization. 
Alexander Gerschenkron (1966), e.g., provided a classic description of how so-called 
universal banks functioned as a substitute for capital markets in late-industrializing 
countries such as Germany during the nineteenth century. While Gerschenkron’s thesis 
has been debated, both in terms of the historical record (Cameron 1972) and its lack 
of attention to political variables (Vitols 2001), the basic distinction between banks 
and markets remains central in comparative studies. Indeed, the simplest (and per-
haps most common) typology of fi nancial systems divides them into “bank-based” and 
“market-based,” depending upon which channel is dominant (Berglöf 1991; Deeg 1999; 
Edwards / Fischer 1994). Bank-based systems are typically associated by the CC litera-
ture with more “organized” forms of capitalism; conversely, securities-market-oriented 
systems are associated with market-dominated capitalisms.
Some early CC literature distinguished not two but three types of fi nancial systems based 
on the respective roles of fi nancial institutions, industry, and the state: capital market 
systems (U.S., Britain), negotiated credit systems dominated by relatively autonomous 
banks and some state assistance (Germany, Sweden), and credit-based systems using state 
ownership or control over investment (France, Japan) (Zysman 1983). This tripartite di-
chotomy was also useful to many scholars, though the widespread withdrawal of interven-
tionist states from a direct role in fi nancial markets has arguably reduced its utility.
Sigurt Vitols extended this line of work by showing how two key dimensions of fi nan-
cial systems (banks vs. markets, and the degree of state intervention in credit allocation) 
are linked to a broader set of institutions (Vitols 1996, 2001). The fundamental choice 
between banks and markets is not only infl uenced by state regulation (Verdier 2001), 
but also by the relative supply and demand for different types of fi nancial assets. Within 
the company sector, small fi rms generate demand for credit, while the large fi xed costs 
of issuing equity restrict demand for equity to large fi rms. For households, high-income 
groups are the most supportive of market-based systems due to their greater capacity to 
invest and absorb short-term risks. Countries with greater income equality tend to have 
high levels of savings by middle-income groups, who may be most supportive of bank-
based systems. The state also impacts the demand for fi nancial assets, particularly secu-
ritized debt that competes with bank deposits as a low-risk form of investment. Finally, 
the method of pension savings shapes the demand for long-term investment in equities 
(Jackson / Vitols 2001). This line of work highlights the extensive embeddedness and po-
tential interdependencies between fi nancial systems and other key institutional domains.
While widely used, the banks-versus-markets dichotomy is problematic in that nearly all 
fi nancial systems utilize both channels, and it is unclear at what point a given fi nancial 
system would be seen as shifting from one system to the other. Moreover, comparing the 
aggregate fl ow of funds to industrial investment shows internal company sources to be 
the most important in both market- and bank-centered cases (Corbett / Jenkinson 1996). 
Equity fi nance makes surprisingly small contributions to company fi nancing even in 
market-oriented countries, and the dominance of bank fi nance was hard to demon-
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strate in any country except for Japan.7 Clearer differences are found in the specifi c 
forms of monitoring associated with different fi nancial systems and their impact on the 
distribution of corporate rewards.8 This kind of data shows why, in the end, the practice 
of distinguishing among fi nancial systems often leads to ambiguous results.
Corporate governance
Corporate governance is a central institutional building block within most CC frame-
works. Within the framework of agency theory, corporate governance is studied in terms 
of how shareholders (“principals”) control management (“agents”) to act in their inter-
ests. Different mechanisms may be used to reduce the costs associated with this control 
and to involve different trade-offs between liquidity and control: incentives contracts (pay 
for performance), reputation building, monitoring by banks or other blockholders, and 
markets for corporate control. Early comparisons posited two basic approaches to con-
trolling agency costs: in some systems, banks play a central role by monitoring corporate 
management through a combination of debt and equity stakes; in other systems, markets 
are the dominant mechanism for corporate control (Berglöf 1991; Edwards / Fischer 1994). 
Later studies distinguished countries on the basis of whether ownership was concentrated 
among large blockholders, such as families, banks, and corporations, or dispersed among 
small shareholders within liquid capital markets, thus producing a typology of block-
holder vs. dispersed ownership for corporate governance systems (Becht / Roel 1999).
Alternative frameworks compare national diversity in terms of relations among mul-
tiple stakeholders. The corporation is often described in terms of the transaction costs 
involved in making fi rm-specifi c investments in employee skills or business coopera-
tion.9 A broad difference exists between countries that include stakeholders such as 
employees in corporate governance and countries that have an exclusively shareholder-
oriented form of capitalism (Kelly / Kelly / Gamble 1997; Parkinson / Kelly 2001). These 
discussions reemerged in the more mainstream economics literature and public policy 
7 Macroeconomic studies show that the relative proportion of assets held by banks or stock 
markets is inversely related (Black / Moersch 1998) and investment in bank-based countries is 
signifi cantly related to the level of bank assets, while investment in market-based countries is 
dependent on the size of stock markets.
8 For example, in fi rms with close relations to banks, investment is less sensitive to liquidity con-
straints (Elston / Albach 1995; Hoshi 1994). 
9 Employee voice can increase trust between labor and management, facilitating such investments, 
improving internal information fl ows, and creating gains in dynamic X-effi ciency (Leibenstein 
1966). Giving “voice” to employees as non-contractual conditions of the contract lessens the 
need for both sides to specify terms and conditions of employment contracts in advance and 
thus creates more fl exibility within the organization. Likewise, a large body of work on trans-
action cost economics stresses that intercorporate ownership may be an effi ciency-enhancing 
“network” governance mechanism that can lower transaction costs and improve industrial or-
ganization with strategic trading partners (Powell 1991). 
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debate as a distinction between systems with insider control by incumbent manage-
ment, employees and suppliers, and those with outsider control by shareholders and 
independent outside directors (Maher / Andersson 1999).
Existing typologies also have other conceptual limits (Aguilera / Jackson 2003). They 
distinguish only between two groups of countries in rather stylized terms, such as the 
United States vs. Germany. And they describe corporate governance in terms of a single 
dominant actor, such as banks, shareholders, or insiders. Moreover, different typologies 
are grounded in different underlying dimensions of economic effi ciency. Yet it appears 
impossible to say a priori which dimension of effi ciency will be most important in 
shaping corporate governance.10 Moreover, social and political factors are also seen as 
increasingly important is explaining the rise of different corporate governance models 
(Fligstein 1990; Roy 1997).
More recently, attempts have been made to relate more systematically diverse organiza-
tional patterns to specifi c institutional variables by way of comparison (Aguilera / Jackson 
2003; Fligstein / Freeland 1995). For example, legal differences in corporate law and fi nan-
cial market regulation are seen as key determinants of national differences in corporate 
ownership patterns (La Porta / Lopez-de-Silanes / Shleifer 1999; La Porta et al. 1998; La Porta 
1999; Roe 1994; Coffee 2000, 2001). Also, the different role of labor and the impact of polit-
ical contention have been shown to be decisive factors infl uencing the national diversity of 
corporate governance (Jackson 2001; Roe 2003; Blair / Roe 1999; Gourevitch / Shinn 2005).
Industrial relations
There is a long and strong tradition of comparing the roles of employers, labor unions 
and employees, and the state in governing employment transactions. Employment rela-
tions may be governed at different levels: fi rm, multiple fi rms, industrial sector, national, 
or international. The comparative literature identifi es a large number of country-spe-
cifi c patterns and documents variation along a wide range of dimensions: the structure 
of labor unions, the organization of employers, the institutions of collective bargaining, 
the degree of state intervention, the extent and forms of industrial confl ict and forms of 
workplace participation in managerial decisions (Bean 1994; Bamber / Lansbury 1998; 
Baglioni / Crouch 1990; Streeck 1992b).
Colin Crouch (1993) identifi es three broad models of interest intermediation in Eu-
rope: confl ictarian relations (e.g. France or Italy), pluralist bargaining (UK), and corpo-
ratism (Sweden or Germany). Each of these models differs with regard to the way labor 
10 Mainstream research has become increasingly agnostic about specifying which type of system 
is more economically effi cient in light of the disappointing results of econometric studies (Roe 
2000: 5–7). Moreover, economic effi ciency depends not only on the technological environment 
and relative factor prices, but also on the institutional environment (Aoki 2001). 
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unions and employers are organized, the extent and role of state intervention, and the 
patterns of bargaining and change. Other authors suggest a fourth model to differenti-
ate between Germany and Scandinavian countries (Ebbinghaus / Visser 1997) in terms 
of their degrees of centralization and linkages to the welfare state.
Spawned in part by intense political debates in recent years over labor market reform 
in Europe, recent distinctions among industrial relations systems have focused on a di-
chotomy between regulated, centralized and deregulated, decentralized systems. Regu-
lated, centralized systems are characterized generally by higher levels of employment 
protection, higher wage replacement rates for unemployment, institutions for labor 
participation in management (e.g., works councils), and collective bargaining institu-
tions – operating at the sectoral, regional, or national level – that reduce wage inequality 
across sectors and skill levels. Conversely, deregulated systems have weak to no employ-
ment protection regulations, less generous unemployment benefi ts, no or discretionary 
institutions for workforce participation, and fi rm-level collective bargaining or indi-
vidualized labor contracts.
Skill creation
This institutional domain is not always considered to be important by comparative 
capitalism approaches and thus does not fi gure into many of them (at least as a distinct 
domain). However, for others working within the CC approach, skill creation systems 
are seen as essential determinants of the overall system and signifi cantly infl uence oth-
er domains such as work organization, corporate governance, and industrial relations 
(Thelen 2004). The creation of employee skills is subject to considerable national and 
sectoral variation. Gaps between nations having high-skill and low-skill equilibriums 
became a major public policy concern in the 1980s (Soskice / Finegold 1988). Many saw 
higher skills as a remedy to the long-term industrial decline of liberal economies such 
as Britain and the United States. In this view the creation of skills in these countries was 
subject to serious market failure, since fi rms compete over skilled labor and may act 
as free riders in appropriating skills that they have not helped generate. Furthermore, 
direct state provision was largely aimed at general education and failed to keep up with 
the changing needs of industry. By contrast, Germany and Japan both represent “high-
skill” patterns that help overcome these various collective action problems in skill gen-
eration through facilitating institutional mechanisms, although in fact they generated 
quite distinct solutions to the “skills dilemma.”
A recent landmark collaborative study has systematically compared various institu-
tional arrangements for skills creation and evaluated their impact on patterns of em-
ployment and economic performance (Crouch / Finegold / Sako 1999). In this study, the 
authors distinguish between different mechanisms for creating initial vocational train-
ing and further vocational training, respectively: direct state provision, free markets, 
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institutional companies, fi rm networks, and corporatist associations.11 Here countries 
are seen as combining different governance mechanisms. For example, Britain and the 
United States. both mix the strong use of markets and on-the-job training by compa-
nies, although the British state also plays a greater role in initial training. Training in 
Japan occurs largely in institutional companies, but also draws upon extended networks 
between companies for technical consulting and dispatched workers.
Work organization (production models)
Numerous scholars in the fi eld of industrial relations became interested in the issues 
of new technology and work organization as it became increasingly clear that the hey-
day of the Fordist paradigm was coming to an end (Kern / Schumann 1984). Emerging 
models of production did not resemble traditional models of either mass production 
or craft production. Three distinctions proved particularly important for differenti-
ating product strategies: whether products were standardized or customized, whether 
products competed primarily via price or quality, and whether the volume of produc-
tion was high or low (Sorge / Streeck 1988). In contrast to traditional mass production 
(standardized, price-competitive, high volume) or craft production (customized, qual-
ity-competitive, low volume), the new pattern discussed in this literature combined 
customization, quality-competition, and higher production volumes. In particular, the 
incorporation of microelectronics into production machinery lowered the costs for 
fl exible reconfi gurations of capital equipment and enabled this new synthesis.
The theoretical excitement about new production methods (typically referred to as post-
Fordist) was that they appeared to correlate with particular forms of social organization 
(or even national systems of capitalism). Within the industrial districts of Northern 
Italy, post-Fordist strategies of fl exible specialization drew upon the embeddedness of 
small fi rms within larger social networks in local communities (Piore / Sabel 1984). For 
Germany, Wolfgang Streeck developed the notion of “diversifi ed quality production” 
to describe the pattern of German manufacturing success woven into the rich fabric 
of employers’ associations and unions that helped generate collective resources such as 
high-skilled occupational training (Streeck 1992a). These post-Fordist strategies drew 
upon high levels of skills, polyvalent and fl exible work organization, and could often 
accommodate high wages.
11 This typology is based on a more general typology of governance mechanisms (Hollings-
worth / Schmitter / Streeck 1994).
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Welfare states
It is increasingly recognized that welfare states do not simply perform the social pro-
tection function of aiding those who cannot provide for themselves adequately in the 
labor market, cannot work, or have retired. Research is just beginning to see the welfare 
state as another essential institutional pillar of the political economy that helps defi ne 
dominant strategies among economic actors and impacts labor markets in particular. 
Esping-Anderson developed a famous distinction between three types of welfare state: 
liberal welfare states that provide low fl at benefi ts on a universal basis, conservative wel-
fare states that make extensive transfer payments for particular social or occupational 
groups on the basis on employment and contributions, and social democratic welfare 
states that provide the most generous and universal support (Esping-Andersen 1990). 
These differences were found to shape employment patterns along a variety of mea-
sures: employment rates, gender gaps in participation and earnings, the duration of un-
employment, the proportion of skilled and unskilled employment, and entry and exit 
from work. Several authors have challenged this threefold typology and have suggested, 
in particular, that many Southern European countries do not fi t into the conservative 
welfare category (Castles 1995; Ferrera 1996). In addition, the Japanese case does not fi t 
easily into existing typologies (Gould 1993; Leibfried 1994).
This literature has recently been extended to show a much broader variety of link ages 
– beyond labor markets – between welfare states and models of capitalism, as well as to 
the role of business preferences in the development of social policy (Ebbinghaus / Manow 
2001; Mares 2003). First, welfare states impact industrial relations and collective bar-
gaining through a variety of mechanisms, e.g., by setting the level of social wages and 
non-wage labor costs, by infl uencing the labor shedding strategies that the social part-
ners favor such as early retirement, or by strengthening the organizational loyalties of 
employees to unions (through self-administered Ghent-type systems) or their fi rms 
(through paternalistic company welfare) (Morgan 1997). Second, patterns of produc-
tion and employment may also be impacted in cases where high labor costs deriving 
from high social protection act as a “benefi cial constraint” that forces employers to spe-
cialize in up-market strategies such as diversifi ed quality production (Streeck 1997). 
Conversely, high social security costs may hamper the employment growth in low pro-
ductivity service industries – particularly for conservative welfare regimes such as Ger-
many (Scharpf / Schmidt 2000a, 2000b). The portability of pension claims is also an 
important factor in supporting or hindering the mobility of labor across fi rms. Third, 
the public–private mix of pension provision has strong effects on the type of fi nancial 
system and corporate governance (Jackson / Vitols 2001). Strong public systems will tend 
to crowd out private savings, thus depriving securities markets of an important source 
of capital. Private schemes will differ to the degree that they remain organizationally 
embedded as a means of company internal fi nance, such as in Germany, or externalized 
as a source of market investment, such as in the United States.
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Innovation
National systems of innovation became a key focus in the comparative literature as 
it became clear that the degree of innovation in an economy depends on the strong 
integration of science and industry (Nelson 1987). National differences in these in-
stitutional linkages were thought to result from different patterns of diffusing knowl-
edge and the different foci of innovation (Lundvall 1992; Nelson 1993). Michael Porter 
made the important point that nations cannot hope to fi nd the single best pattern of 
innovation (Porter 1990). Rather, different types of innovation exist: organizational or 
technical, process or product, and incremental or radical. Porter demonstrated that the 
strengths of Britain or the United States were in areas of radical innovation and chang-
ing technologies. Meanwhile, Germany and Japan were stronger in areas of incremental 
innovation in the processes and products of well-established industrial sectors.
A number of subsequent studies have sought to elaborate on Porter’s basic distinction 
in order to better defi ne the institutional preconditions for different sorts of innova-
tion (Soskice 1996). The basic answer is that highly coordinated economies often prove 
better able to generate the collective inputs necessary to foster incremental innovations 
within stable organizational settings. Highly skilled manual workers, long-term capital 
investments, cooperative labor relations or standard setting across companies all help 
foster the innovations that depend on incremental improvement of process or product 
design. By contrast, more market-oriented and competitive economies are better able 
to generate the labor mobility and venture capital necessary to pursue or incorporate 
radical science-based innovation. A new body of literature has also emerged on the way 
conditions for innovation are related to the different capacities of fi rms and their gov-
ernance arrangements across countries (O’Sullivan 2000).
Herbert Kitschelt (1991) also revealed an interesting link between governance structures 
and the technological constraints posed in particular economic sectors. Technologies 
may differ in their degree of asset-specifi city and in the global or local nature of learn-
ing processes. Likewise, technologies differ in the degree of uncertainty they involve. 
Some technologies have learning processes that occur in incremental steps, while others 
proceed in more revolutionary jumps. For example, nuclear energy and space explora-
tion face high degrees of uncertainty and require asset-specifi c investments; they are 
facilitated by highly coordinated efforts and state planning. By contrast, the fi elds of 
computer software and biotechnology also face high degrees of uncertainty but require 
fewer asset-specifi c investments. More local learning occurs in these fi elds that benefi ts 
from a public R&D infrastructure and more fl exible forms of organization. A crucial 
point is that national variants of capitalism will have differential innovation perfor-
mance across sectors and may tend to further specialize around these particular areas 
of production (Boyer 2003).
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Alternative synthetic frameworks within comparative capitalism
Since Albert’s (1993) popular characterization of the differences between Rhineland 
and Anglo-Saxon capitalism, the question of how capitalist diversity is best conceptu-
alized and compared remains hotly debated. Whereas some authors contrast only two 
comprehensive types, others identify anywhere from three to six families of capitalism. 
Each of these refl ects a trade-off between parsimony and complexity in describing the 
unique features of individual cases. Typologies with fewer types attempt to capture the 
different domains within a single economy under one general theory or principle. In so 
doing, however, they risk losing the ability to understand and explain the very different 
dynamics that occur in different institutional domains (including political ones). Alter-
natively, some view each country as having a unique constellation of institutions. Even 
where there is agreement on which countries belong in the same category, authors do 
not always agree on how to “label” the various models. Geographic labels such as Anglo-
American or Rhineland may help point to common history or culture, but say little ana-
lytically about the characteristics of the model. The CC literature offers a large number 
of analytic labels, but these attempts show the diffi culties in fi nding a single term that 
accurately captures the overall logic of a given model of capitalism (Amable 2003).
This section reviews the various attempts at synthetic analysis with special attention 
to the institutional domains used in each alternative framework to classify national re-
gimes, the resulting typologies used to describe different types of capitalism, and the 
theories on linkages between institutions. Important questions remain about the way 
the various building blocks of national capitalisms “fi t together.” While some authors 
stress the complementarities between various institutions and the path-dependent 
nature of change, other authors suggest that various institutional elements are more 
“loosely coupled” and more easily changed or combined with new institutions.
The varieties of capitalism approach
One popular approach in the CC literature commonly labeled the “Varieties of Capi-
talism” (VoC) approach centers on the work of David Soskice (1999) and Peter Hall 
(2001a). These authors compare capitalisms as production regimes and focus on micro-
agents such as fi rms, employees, or shareholders and how they organize production. 
The framework seeks to offer an institutional explanation for cross-national differences 
in micro-behavior, especially that of business fi rms. In this VoC framework, firms are 
embedded in a context with four institutional domains that defi ne their incentives and 
constraints: fi nancial systems and corporate governance, industrial relations, educa-
tion and training systems, and the inter-company system (the governance of relations 
between companies).12 The approach articulates a theory of comparative institutional 
12 Welfare states are also mentioned as supporting particular relational strategies of fi rms and thus 
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advantage, wherein “the institutional structure of the political economy provides fi rms 
with advantages for engaging in specifi c kinds of activities” (Hall / Soskice 2001a: 32).
Hall and Soskice start with the assumptions drawn from resource-based theories of the 
fi rm (Barney 2001), namely that fi rms seek to develop core competencies and dynamic 
capabilities that enable them to produce and to market goods or services profi tability. 
The pursuit of these competencies and capabilities, however, requires fi rms to develop 
and manage (“coordinate”) relationships with other fi rms and agents. Following the 
new institutional economies of industrial organization (Milgrom / Roberts 1992; Wil-
liamson 1975; Williamson 1991), the VoC approach recognizes and underscores that 
these relationships create transaction costs and principal-agent problems. Through 
strategic interaction, actors fi nd equilibrium solutions to these coordination problems 
within a range delimited by the institutional context.
Focusing on the mid-1980s to mid-1990s, the authors distinguish two basic types of 
production regimes (capitalisms): liberal market economies (LME’s) and coordinated 
market economies (CME’s). This typology is based on the relative extent of market co-
ordination through investment in transferable assets vs. strategic coordination through 
investment in specifi c assets. LME’s and CME’s represent polar opposite ideal-types. In 
liberal economies such as the United States, United Kingdom, or Canada, the market 
plays the dominant role in coordinating economic behavior, and the state remains an 
arm’s-length enforcer of contracts. Across the four institutional domains (which the 
authors also characterize in dichotomous terms), LME’s share the following charac-
teristics: short-term orientated company fi nance, deregulated labor markets, general 
education, and strong inter-company competition. In coordinated economies such as 
Germany, Sweden, or Switzerland, economic behavior is strategically coordinated to a 
larger extent through nonmarket mechanisms. CME’s are characterized by long-term 
industrial fi nance, cooperative industrial relations, high levels of vocational training, 
and cooperation in technology and standard setting across companies.13
While this framework draws closely on the new institutional economics, Hall and 
Soskice reverse one analytical assumption in an important way: whereas convention-
ally, structure is argued to follow strategy (e.g., fi rms create structures that are effi cient 
for them), Hall and Soskice stress that strategy follows structure and thereby leads to 
different fi rm behavior across institutional settings (Hall / Soskice 2001a: 14–15; Allen 
2004). The authors thus allow social and political information to enter into their model, 
but retain a fundamentally economic view of action. Notably, Hall and Soskice tend to 
rely on rather ad hoc descriptions of actual institutions and institutional forms. The 
correspond to the overall type of capitalism (Hall / Soskice 2001a: 50–51). However, this idea is 
not integrated systematically.
13 Only briefl y do the authors differentiate further between two subgroups of CMEs: in industry-
coordinated economies, such as Germany, coordination takes place within the industrial sector 
or branch, whereas in group-coordinated economies, such as Japan or South Korea, coordination 
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VoC framework places the economic functions of institutions in terms of coordination 
in the foreground, rather than the actor constellations and details of their structure.
A fi nal key claim is that models of capitalism display strong complementarities between 
the four institutional domains, such that each institution depends on the others in order 
to function effectively (Soskice 1999: 110). Where institutions facilitate strategic (or mar-
ket) coordination in one domain, these support similar forms of coordination in other 
spheres. For example, short-term fi nance requires quick entry and exit from business ac-
tivities and “fi ts” with industrial relations systems that allow inexpensive hiring and fi r-
ing of labor. An important implication of complementarities is that viable public policy 
changes must be incentive-compatible with existing patterns of business organization.
This notion of institutional complementarity is compelling, but also contains 
ambiguities. The presence of complementarities across different institutional domains 
leads the authors to argue that institutions should not be distributed randomly, but 
clustered into the relatively cohesive types as described above. Yet Hall and Soskice 
empirically observe a large number of intermediate “mixed” cases, suggesting that many 
countries do not have coherent models of capitalism. In fact, recent work has devel-
oped empirical indicators for these dimensions, and, as a result, produced four clus-
ters of nations (Hall / Soskice 2001b). However, their theory suggests that such mixed 
cases should be less effi cient and yield poorer economic performance than the more 
coherent polar types (Hall / Soskice 2001b). The empirical evidence for this thesis re-
mains hotly debated (Hall / Gingerich 2004; Kenworthy 2006). Moreover, substantial 
debate has erupted over the way to reconcile the view of complementarities as “mutual 
reinforcement” with empirical observations of institutional incoherence and change. 
The issue boils down to an attempt to spell out what causal processes might produce 
institutional complementarities. Does the state create and implement coherent policy 
across such diverse institutional domains? Do economic actors actively create these in-
stitutions to solve their economic problems? Are processes of selection leading coun-
tries toward coherence? 
Hall and Soskice offer only a few general hypotheses. One argument links the political 
strength of producer interests with regime characteristics: 
[T]he political regime may condition the levels of asset specifi city found across nations … po-
litical regimes characterized by coalition governments, multiple veto points, and parties that 
entrench the power of producer groups may be more conducive to investment in specifi c assets 
than ones that concentrate power in highly autonomous party leaders, because (i) regimes of 
this sort are well positioned to provide the framework policies that sustain the institutions sup-
porting specifi c investments and (ii) because they provide producers with more direct infl uence 
over government and the capacity to punish it for deviating from its agreements, such regimes 
offer investors more assurance that the course of policy will not shift in such a way as to damage 
the value of assets that cannot readily be switched to other uses. (Hall / Soskice 2001a: 49–50)
 takes place across groups of companies. These subgroups mirror a distinction between associa-
tions vs. networks found in the “governance approach” described below.
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Ultimately this approach runs into several limitations in dealing with dynamic aspects 
of political economy. Perhaps to a greater extent than other approaches within the CC 
literature, this framework imports and integrates traditional tools of economic analy-
sis. Given that strategy should follow structure, it rightly argues that business fi rms 
may react differently to similar exogenous pressures, such as international competition 
(Hall / Soskice 2001a: 64). But a strong version of complementarities makes it hard to 
discern how endogenous dynamics of capitalist models arise. The argument has strong 
affi nities with theories of path-dependence, where signifi cant change requires very large 
endogenous shocks. The theory thus describes relatively static models of capitalism that 
refl ect highly coherent and stable “equilibrium” outcomes.
Governance approaches
Another more loosely developed approach may be associated with a series of collab-
orative publications from the mid-1990s (Hollingsworth / Schmitter / Streeck 1994; 
Hollingsworth / Boyer 1997a; Crouch / Streeck 1997). These authors map the diversity 
of coordination mechanisms used in the governance of economic activity. Beyond the 
traditional distinction between markets and hierarchies, the framework includes com-
munities, the state, networks, and associations. These six basic governance mechanisms 
differ along two underlying dimensions: the degree of self-interest or obligations for 
actors, and the degree to which power is distributed horizontally or exercised vertically. 
Each governance mechanism has its own organizational structure, rules of exchange 
and enforcement, and typical strengths or failures (Hollingsworth / Boyer 1997b: 6–19). 
In contrast to Hall and Soskice, who emphasize rational, strategic behavior within a set 
of fi xed institutions, the governance framework pays more attention to social norms 
and “logics of appropriateness” in shaping actor behavior and institutional choices (in 
this sense, this framework is also more sensitive to the way strategy shapes structures).
In their fi rst book, the authors used industrial sectors (rather than nations) as a basic 
unit of comparative analysis (Hollingsworth / Schmitter / Streeck 1994), as do theories 
of organization that predict variation in accordance with economic and technological 
conditions of task environments, i.e., industrial sectors (Fligstein / Freeland 1995). In 
the eight countries they study, the authors fi nd signifi cant differences in governance 
mechanisms across sectors within individual countries. Yet the authors conclude that 
just as sectoral differences in technology and market conditions give rise to differences in indus-
trial order within countries, national differences produce different governance regimes within 
sectors … Differences in governance within sectors are often recognizable as national differ-
ences in that they follow a similar logic across sectors. (Hollingsworth / Streeck 1994: 272)
They explain this by arguing that social institutions supporting different mechanisms 
of economic governance are, for the most part, nationally distinct in, e.g., the degree of 
state intervention, the propensity to form associations, or the use of relational trading 
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in networks. Parallel to those of Hall and Soskice, these fi ndings suggested that links 
between national institutions and sectoral governance generate comparative institu-
tional advantages in particular sectors or market segments within sectors. Different sets 
of institutions are either more or less supportive of particular modes of governance and 
thus either enable or constrain different sorts of company strategies.
Several innovations and extensions of this approach were made in subsequent work. First, 
a more systematic notion of “social systems of production” (SSP) was introduced to de-
scribe and explain the dominant production strategies of fi rms as they are coordinated 
through different governance mechanisms and supported by their embeddedness in par-
ticular institutional confi gurations. This framework highlights differences between Ford-
ist mass production and alternative patterns of fl exible specialization or diversifi ed quality 
production. Second, the affi nities between particular coordination mechanisms and the 
spatial-territorial scope of governance were examined. Four levels of spatial organization 
were distinguished: regions within a country, nation states, transnational regions such as 
the European Community, and the global level (Hollings worth / Boyer 1997b: 24–33).
The governance approach was also applied to holistic comparison of national variet-
ies of capitalism (Crouch / Streeck 1997). Picking up on the typology of governance 
mechanisms described above, this approach makes a broad distinction between coun-
tries governed largely by markets and hierarchies (market capitalism) and those using 
a richer variety of coordination mechanisms (institutional capitalism). However, the 
authors offered no strict typology of national capitalisms. Using the loose collection of 
governance concepts, they strive in various chapters to understand the distinguishing 
features of particular national varieties of capitalism and to interpret the internal logic 
of each model (Pontusson 1997; Regini 1997).14
The recent work of Bruno Amable (2003) synthesizes many aspects of the strategic 
interaction and equilibrium analysis central to Hall and Soskice with the sensitivity to 
social embeddedness and institutional choices highlighted in the social systems of pro-
duction approach. Amable utilizes fi ve institutional domains to generate his typology: 
product market competition, the wage-labor nexus or labor market institutions, fi nance 
and corporate governance, social protection / welfare state, and the education / training 
system.15 Grouping capitalist economies based on their similarities (using cluster analy-
sis) in these institutional domains generates fi ve models of capitalism: a market-based 
model, a social-democratic model, a continental European model, a Mediterranean 
model, and an Asian model (2003).
14 However, Boyer (1997: 75) argues that “the process of institutionalization refl ects the social and 
political confl ict particular to each country” and this justifi es the identifi cation of four major 
variants of capitalism: market-oriented (Anglo-Saxon countries), Rhineland (Germany, Japan), 
statist (France, Italy), and social democratic (Sweden, Austria). 
15 Each of his domain typologies is fairly complicated with four to six types or clusters of countries 
within each domain; this produces a relatively large and complex matrix of theoretically pos-
sible combinations of institutions.
26 MPIfG Discussion Paper 06 / 2
One of the key additions Amable makes to the SSP and VoC approaches is the further 
development of the political dimension to models of capitalism. This turns out to be 
very important toward understanding change and the evolution of a capitalist system 
(a general weakness of the CC literature). He does this fi rst in his defi nition of institu-
tions as “political-economic equilibriums” to refl ect the fact that they embody political 
compromises as well as functional (suffi ciently effi cient) rules. This deviates from a 
strict rational choice view of institutions in so far as institutions are conceived as de-
signed not primarily to solve coordination problems between equal agents with similar 
interests, but to solve confl icts among unequal actors with divergent interests (Amable 
2003: 7–11). Second, Amable argues that the institutional choices / confi gurations (and 
the hierarchy of institutions) existing in a national economy refl ect the preferences of 
the dominant social bloc. Thus institutional choices and change refl ect the political 
coalitions that emerge and are successful in political competition with other coalitions. 
Further, the character of the political system itself (e.g., whether it concentrates or dis-
perses power) will affect the likelihood of any given coalition’s success as well as the 
likelihood of institutional change.
National business systems approach
Richard Whitley developed a systematic approach to comparing business systems, de-
fi ned as “distinctive patterns of economic organization that vary in their degree and 
mode of authoritative coordination of economic activities, and in the organization 
of, and interconnections between, owners, managers, experts, and other employees” 
(Whitley 1999: 33). The typology describes activities as being coordinated through pri-
vate property rights or through other sorts of association that do not involve unifi ed 
ownership. Altogether, eight aspects of business systems are compared:
1. the means of owner control (direct, alliance, or market);
2. the extent of integration of production chains by ownership (low, medium, high);
3. the extent of integration of industrial sectors through ownership;
4. the extent of alliance coordination of production chains;
5. the extent of collaboration between competitors;
6. the extent of alliance coordination of sectors;
7. the extent of employer-employee interdependence;
8. the extent of delegation to and trust of employees.
This approach yields six basic ideal-types of business systems: fragmented, coordinated 
industrial district, compartmentalized, state-organized, collaborative, and highly coor-
dinated. In simplifi ed form, four basic types are distinguished by the degree (high or 
low) to which coordination occurs through ownership and through nonownership (e.g. 
networks or associations), respectively. Coordination may also occur either vertically by 
integrating production chains or horizontally to integrate industrial sectors.
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In fragmented business systems, overall coordination is very low such that economic ac-
tivity is undertaken by small fi rms in highly competitive markets. In industrial districts, 
such as “Third Italy,” a greater degree of coordination exists among competitors. In 
compartmentalized systems, such as in the United States, large integrated and somewhat 
autarkic fi rms compete with each other in arm’s-length markets. Collaborative systems 
imply a rather corporatist or associational organization of competitors within a sector. 
In addition, Whitley suggests two additional types of business systems: state-organized 
and highly coordinated. State-organized systems look basically like compartmentalized 
systems except that ownership control remains direct rather than fragmented in the 
market due to the state subsidies in the form of credit to large fi rms, as in France. Mean-
while, highly coordinated systems utilize an alliance form of ownership to coordinate 
activities across sectors, such as in the Japanese keiretsu.
Beyond this descriptive typology, Whitley also compares the institutional features that 
enable and constrain different sorts of business systems. Unlike Hall and Soskice, Whit-
ley carefully distinguishes the dimensions of the institutional environment from the 
organizational patterns which they produce. These institutional factors are later linked 
to business systems in terms of schematic hypotheses about whether institutions en-
courage or discourage various features of the latter.16
1. States are compared in terms of the strength of intervention, the degree to which it 
encourages intermediary organizations, and the strength of market regulation.
2. Financial systems are compared in terms of the conventional dichotomy between 
capital-market systems vs. bank-based systems.
3. Skill development and control is compared in terms of the strength of public train-
ing, the strength of unions, the organizing principle of unions (skill, sector or em-
ployer), and the centralization of bargaining.
4. Trust and authority are compared in terms of the degree of trust in formal institu-
tions, the type of business environment, and the relative degree of paternalist, com-
munitarian, or contractarian authority.
16 Perhaps more than other authors working within this framework, Lane does justice to differences 
between large and small fi rms within the respective national economies (Lane 1993, 1995). She also 
introduces the training and careers of management as a distinct variable within business systems. 
Figure 2 A simplifi ed classifi cation of business systems based on Whitley
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Competitive small fi rms
Industrial districts
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Whitley’s typologies depart refreshingly from the implicit tactic of measuring capitalist 
diversity in terms of its “deviations” from a liberal Anglo-American “normal capital-
ism” and attempt to describe capitalist diversity in their own terms using a sociological 
framework. While the basic variables are quite similar to those found in Soskice and 
Hall, the introduction of the different dimensions of ownership control and sectoral 
vs. intersectoral coordination allows more fi ne-grained distinctions. Yet the business 
systems approach asks many of the same questions as the rest of the CC literature: is 
activity coordinated through markets, networks, or hierarchies? If coordination extends 
across fi rms, does it cover competing fi rms within the same sector or fi rms across mul-
tiple sectors? In this sense, a substantive similarity with other approaches is apparent.
How many models of capitalism exist in Western Europe?
Several other authors offer middle-range comparisons that are not primarily geared to 
developing conceptual frameworks, but do go beyond single-country case studies by 
comparing several European countries. Vivien Schmidt, e.g., places particular emphasis 
on “bringing the state back in” to comparative research by highlighting three ideal-
typical patterns of state economy policy (Schmidt 2000, 2002): the liberal state giving 
great autonomy to economic actors (UK), the enabling state encouraging associational 
governance among private actors (Germany), and the interventionist state directly in-
tervening to coordinate private activity (France). In so doing, Schmidt deviates from 
many other CC approaches in suggesting that the state can be treated as an independent 
political-economic actor. Her main empirical focus shows that, while internationaliza-
tion is pushing all countries toward a more encompassing form of market-oriented 
capitalism, Germany and France each face distinct sorts of adjustment problems and 
follow their own independent pathways of change. Schmidt suggests that state capitalist 
models have been hit harder than managed capitalism by internationalization because 
of the signifi cant retreat of the state, as contrasted with the more incremental and de-
centralized adjustment in Germany.
Other European comparisons also use three types of capitalism albeit with different la-
bels, namely Anglo-Saxon, Germanic (e.g. Germany or the Netherlands), and Latin capi-
talism (e.g. France, Spain, Italy) (Rhodes / van Apeldoorn 1997). In this work, corporate 
governance is the central institutional domain used to distinguish national capitalisms, 
and a broad set of features are considered such as the relative role of banks vs. stock 
markets, the type of owners, the structure of management boards, and the role of em-
ployees. The authors carefully distinguish some subtle differences between the German-
ic and Latin forms of “network capitalism.” Like Schmidt, however, they also stress that 
both network capitalisms face pressures from globalization that increase shareholder 
pressure and erode the position of labor. Neither model is likely to serve as a template at 
the European level, where regulation is strongly biased toward market-oriented nega-
tive integration.
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Bernhard Ebbinghaus (1999) presents Europe in terms of four basic models of capital-
ism: Nordic, Center, Southern, and Anglo-Saxon. His typology draws upon eight insti-
tutional domains: fi nance, production regime, the organized interests of labor, patterns 
of collective bargaining, employment patterns, labor market regulation, welfare-state 
fi nancing, and patterns of social security. Ebbinghaus is distinctive in highlighting the 
impact of welfare state arrangements on the social organization of private economic 
activity. For example, the Nordic model can be distinguished from Germany’s Center 
model by its universalist welfare state that supports much higher labor force participa-
tion (Pontusson 1997). The Nordic, Center, and Southern models are also easily dis-
tinguished in terms of the strength and centralization of labor unions. In echoing a 
central theme of the CC literature, Ebbinghaus argues that, while different institutional 
elements of national models are separately governed, the elements are “mutually-sup-
porting and dependent of each other” (16). However, for Ebbinghaus the elements are 
only “loosely coupled,” displaying functional interdependence but also varying degrees 
of inconsistency. For example, welfare regimes impact the role of the social partners in 
industrial relations, as is evident in cases in which social policy supports corporatism or 
reinforces occupational status divisions. But institutional interdependence also impacts 
the problems and adjustment processes faced in both institutional domains, as is illus-
trated by the case in which limits in welfare spending end strategies of early retirement 
used by the social partners at the company level.
Capitalism in East Asia
The CC literature is primarily focused on Western Europe and North America. Although 
Japan is often included, it is lumped together with coordinated capitalism. But a notable 
set of studies have addressed differences in the capitalist organization within East Asia 
– particularly Korea, Taiwan, and Japan – and thus broadened our understanding of 
capitalist variation (Orru / Biggart / Hamilton 1997; Whitley 1992). In such studies the 
focus has been typically on differences in the way enterprise groups coordinate and con-
trol economic activity. The early comparisons argued that isomorphism within coun-
tries refl ects the institutionalization of particular legitimate patterns of behavior de-
scribed in terms of Japanese community, Korean patrimonialism, and familial networks 
in Taiwan (Biggart 1991). These institutions refl ect differences in state intervention in 
the economy through the attempts of rulers to establish or maintain legitimate political 
rule (Orru / Biggart / Hamilton 1997: 140).
Later comparisons established a more comprehensive distinction among three types of 
capitalism: alliance capitalism, dirigiste capitalism, and familial capitalism (Orru / Big-
gart / Hamilton 1997). The classifi cation derives from the relative use of horizontal and 
vertical coordination in different levels of the economy. Alliance capitalism involves 
cooperation across the boundaries of fi rms and elaborate horizontal linkages between 
institutional domains. These patterns are exemplifi ed by Germany and Japan, whose 
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economies have a strong infrastructure of associations and cooperative relations be-
tween fi nance, industry, and labor. Dirigiste capitalism is typifi ed by France and South 
Korea, where institutional domains are connected by the subordination of the private 
economy to centralized political infl uence. Finally, family capitalism, such as in Italy 
or Taiwan, is typifi ed by smaller fi rms that are strongly segmented across the lines of 
personalistic family networks.
These studies on East Asia have advocated a theoretical agenda to clarify the nature of 
institutional explanation. The authors contrast institutional analysis with market, cul-
tural, and political explanations of national differences. For example, the approach re-
jects one-direction causality from state action to organizational forms:  “… rather than 
positing state action as the prime mover, we are inclined to see the state in each society 
as interacting (in different degrees and with different strategies) with the other orga-
nizational forms in that society” (Orru / Biggart / Hamilton 1997: 157). Again, economic 
action is viewed as being embedded within institutional contexts that create particular 
contexts of rationality and coherence.
Comparing comparative approaches to capitalism
The previous section outlines a number of distinct approaches for comparing capital-
ism across countries, summarized broadly in Figure 3.
The review points to three theoretical innovations which, taken together, defi ne and 
unify these approaches into what we have called the CC literature. First, the CC lit-
erature offers useful typologies for grouping distinct institutional confi gurations into 
distinct types of systems. Second, the literature suggests a theory of comparative insti-
tutional advantage in which different institutional arrangements have distinct strengths 
and weaknesses for different kinds of economic activity. Third, the literature may be 
interpreted to imply a theory of institutional path dependence. Contrary to notions of 
convergence on a single model of best practice, the CC literature stresses how common 
pressures may be refracted through different sets of institutions, leading to different 
sorts of problems and calling forth distinct solutions. We conclude with a brief discus-
sion of debatable issues related to each of these innovations that should be the foci of 
future research and theorizing.
Capitalism as confi gurations: domains, dimensions, and typologies
A fi rst issue concerns the number of institutional domains to include in cross-national 
comparisons. Little theoretical debate has addressed the way to systematize the different 
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institutional domains. One major issue dividing opinion in the literature is whether the 
role of the state and the impact of the welfare state should be included. Likewise, vari-
ous functional domains are sometimes aggregated into one labor market domain, or 
sometimes disaggregated into skill formation, industrial relations, labor markets, etc. 
In short, the theoretical criteria for developing comparative typologies remain open to 
debate. But the presence or absence of some domains often has a strong infl uence on 
how we categorize a particular country.
Issues also exist around the number of dimensions and complexity of types used to 
describe the particular institutional domains. For example, most approaches include 
fi nancial systems as an institutional domain, but different dimensions can be used to 
describe fi nancial systems. Focused comparative studies often suggest more relevant 
dimensions within each respective institutional domain than commonly incorpo-
rated within the synthetic literature. Here the VoC approach stands out for its very 
parsimonious distinction between strategic and market coordination. But the use of 
complex typologies that create three, four, or more “types” for each institutional do-
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main – as Amable does – generates more combinations of variables than the nearly 25 
national cases commonly studied.
A third issue relates to whether an institutional domain should be considered as domi-
nant, and if so, which one. Many typologies are based – implicitly or explicitly – on a 
notion of institutional hierarchy in which one particular (or perhaps a couple) insti-
tutional domain is either given analytical priority or seen as the primary determinant 
of the overall system and systemic logic, i.e., complementary institutional domains are 
adapted or evolve in response to the primary domain. Regulation theory, e.g., views the 
wage-labor nexus as the dominant domain (at least in Fordist production regimes). 
More recently Boyer has suggested that the fi nancial domain has supplanted the wage-
labor nexus as the dominant domain (also Amable 2003). Other typologies, such as 
Rhodes and Appeldorn’s, favor fi nance and corporate governance.
What differences thus emerge at the level of country typologies? One of the primary (if 
not the primary) ordering principles for nearly all frameworks within the CC literature 
is the degree of coordination among actors outside markets. Thus, at one end of this 
spectrum nearly all studies cluster a similar group of countries within a category of 
liberal or market-oriented economies.17 In other words, if there is any consensus across 
the literature it is on the character and membership of the liberal economies. Toward 
the other end, however, greater challenges and divergence emerge in classifying and 
understanding the nonliberal or coordinated types of capitalism. In part, this is so be-
cause authors introduce other ordering principles, such as the degree and character of 
state intervention. Hall and Soskice largely elide these distinctions among coordinated 
systems in order to develop a parsimonious dichotomy that has a distinct advantage 
in testing hypothesis with the use of statistical models (Hall / Gingerich 2004; Paunes-
cu / Schneider 2004; Rueda / Pontusson 2000).
However, if comparison is limited to two polar types, much diversity remains hidden. The 
concept of “coordination” becomes overstretched to cover very different mechanisms of 
coordination and governance (Allen 2004). This approach fails to suffi ciently distinguish 
among Western European countries and does not capture distinctive features of East 
Asian countries. For example, Germany and Japan have similarities as two nonliberal 
types of capitalism, but signifi cant differences exist between them (Streeck / Yamamura 
2001). Likewise, very broad categories, such as that of “coordinated” market economies, 
may lead us to overlook important changes “within” such broad categories, changes that 
fall short of being complete shifts to the opposite polar category. For example, many 
recent studies of Germany have shown that the country has undergone major institu-
tional change; in a sense, German fi rms have experienced an Anglo-Saxonization. Over-
17 Even this category often overlooks important differences between Britain and the United States. 
Moreover, the term “market-based” fails to describe important elements of the U.S. economy, 
such as the important legacies of state and military intervention for the development of its in-
novation system. 
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all, Germany remains a CME, but the German “model” is now very different from what 
it was in the past (Beyer / Höpner 2003; Deeg 2005a, 2005b; Jackson 2005c; Vitols 2004).
At the other extreme, an important branch of research has shied away from even proposing 
broad typologies at the country level and focused on very specifi c paired comparisons 
or on the interpretation of individual cases (Crouch / Streeck 1997; Sorge / Warner 
1986; Maurice / Sellier / Silvestre 1986; Crouch 2005). The SSP approach, for instance, is 
primarily concerned with developing a broad typology of governance mechanisms, such 
as hierarchies, networks, associations, and the state. The SSP authors tend to view each 
national case as unique and rely to a greater extent on thick description of specifi c cases, 
albeit using a common vocabulary of governance concepts. An intermediate position is 
taken by Whitley, whose typologies incorporate a wide range of institutional variables 
and compare them against bi-polar or sometimes even more complex dimensions. He 
is thus able to identify a larger number of distinctive types of business systems and map 
this variation in a systematic way. One strategy is to use ideal-types, whereas another is 
to simply attempt an inductive empirical clustering of cases. Amable (2003) also takes 
the intermediate position. While he uses cluster analysis to identify the groups or types 
of capitalism to be found, he provides a deductive theoretical argument to explain those 
clusters, like Whitley (1999) (Boyer 2004 also uses cluster analysis). A limited number of 
ideal-types may be a useful bridge between generalization and the specifi cs of individual 
cases. It may also be noted that infl uential theorists, such as Aoki, approach comparative 
institutional analysis without seeking to create broad national typologies, but to estab-
lish instead middle-range theoretical models that map diversity within domains and to 
identify a limited number of bi-lateral linkages between them (Aoki 2001).
In sum, mapping capitalist diversity requires the integration of a larger number of 
dimensions and a number of related analytical trade-offs. Fewer types of capitalism 
may make it easier to perform parsimonious statistical tests of the underlying models. 
However, the robustness of theories built around broadly defi ned types of capitalism 
is unlikely to be great due to the internal complexity and the contextual nature of the 
causal effects, which is a basic premise of the CC literature (Rueda / Pontusson 2000). 
Even a “most similar case” comparative design is likely to discover important differences 
“within” types of capitalism. Although generalization across national cases may be elu-
sive, the CC literature is distinguished by its ability to inform a holistic understanding 
of national cases. Policy questions can be asked in a more contextual and precise way by 
understanding the linkages between different institutional domains.
Comparative institutional advantage
A central implication of the CC literature is caution against the notion of a single best 
way to organize an economy. Instead it is emphasized that institutional diversity cre-
ates comparative institutional advantage because different sets of institutions may ex-
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hibit various strengths and weaknesses when it comes to supporting different sorts of 
economic activity. The CC literature usually focuses on institutions as an independent 
variable and examines their impact on modes of governance and company strategies. 
Institutions are viewed as being in a position to enable and constrain particular busi-
ness strategies. Business fi rms will select strategies and develop competencies that “fi t” 
their respective institutional environments. Ultimately, the institutional context and the 
actor strategies that follow from them are linked to performance outcomes. What as-
pects of economic performance are generally considered?
First, the bread and butter of the VoC approach is a fi rm-centered perspective describ-
ing the affi nities between different institutions and the product market strategies of 
business fi rms. Business strategies are generally described in broad qualitative terms 
and point to different niches with respect to price, quantity, and quality.18 For exam-
ple, German fi rms tend to specialize in high-quality markets, producing lower volumes 
of specialized products that are relatively insensitive to small differences in price. This 
“high-road” niche both accommodates the constraint of high and uniform wages in 
Germany and makes use of collective inputs such as the broad occupational training of 
blue-collar workers and cooperative institutions of codetermination. With some excep-
tions, a general consensus exists within the CC literature that fi rms operating within a 
variety of capitalist settings can – following different market strategies – nonetheless be 
similarly successful in terms of growth and profi tability.
In a similar fashion, performance is increasingly being framed around issues of inno-
vation rather than production per se. Hall and Soskice in particular linked patterns of 
fi rm- and national-level innovation to the broader system of capitalism. Specifi cally, 
they argued that coordinated market economies were characterized by incremental in-
novation, while liberal market economies excelled in radical innovation. While some 
evidence supports this, other evidence raises doubts that such a simple connection can 
be made between patterns of innovation and system-type (Zachary Taylor 2004). It thus 
remains an important area for future research.
Second, growing attention is being paid to overall macroeconomic performance, such 
as growth, unemployment, or the welfare state (Scharpf / Schmidt 2000a, 2000b). The 
CC literature has proven useful in generating country-specifi c case studies that sharpen 
our understanding of public policy choices. European policy makers have become in-
creasingly aware that socioeconomic problems are unlikely to be resolved through iso-
lated policy measures, but require some coordination across different policy networks 
because of complementarities. For example, one case study of the Netherlands stresses 
this approach because employment performance was improved through a sustained 
series of coordinated labor market and welfare state reforms that did not rely on drastic 
market deregulation (Visser / Hemerijck 1997).
18 Relatively little attention is paid to econometric comparison of company performance using 
accounting data.
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Yet the ability of the CC literature to explain divergence in national macroeconomic 
performance remains hotly debated. Hall and Gingerich (Hall / Gingerich 2004), for in-
stance, found evidence to validate the Hall and Soskice (VoC) thesis that national mac-
roeconomic performance is positively correlated with the degree of internal coherence 
or consistency around either the basic logic of market coordination or strategic coordi-
nation. In a similarly structured analysis, Kenworthy (2006) fi nds no correlation, which 
indicates that the research may lack robustness with regard to the time periods and clas-
sifi cations of countries. Circumventing this debate, Boyer (2004) approached this issue 
inductively using cluster analysis and found at least three institutional confi gurations 
that produced successful “technology-led growth regimes” (Boyer 2004). However, it is 
diffi cult to make inferences about the complementarities among certain confi gurations 
through their macroeconomic performance, because fortuna of external circumstances 
may prevail and compensate for the underlying institutional mismatch.19
Third, one underemphasized aspect of the CC literature that has great potential con-
cerns the distributional consequences of capitalist diversity. For example, national cor-
porate governance models have different normative conceptions of who should control 
the corporation and create distributions of rents among the various stakeholders within 
the fi rm (De Jong 1996; Dore 2000). Another issue concerns international differences 
in the levels of inequality (Rueda / Pontusson 2000). Countries such as Sweden, Germa-
ny, or Japan were able to achieve excellent economic performance and maintain much 
more egalitarian patterns of income distribution than Anglo-Saxon models of capi-
talism. However, institutional change has begun to disrupt many of the distributional 
compromises embedded within past models of capitalism and itself becoming a source 
of future institutional change (Dore 2000). Thus, different systems of capitalism may 
produce different levels or patterns of social exclusion.
Institutional path dependence
A fi nal innovation relates to the issue of institutional change. A central concern of the 
CC literature is the nature of institutional linkages and complementarities within na-
tional varieties of capitalism. If one institutional domain displays complementarities 
or “fi t” with another institution, what does this say about the dynamics of institutional 
change?
One important possibility emphasized in the literature is that change will be largely 
incremental and path dependent, in the sense recently used within economic literature 
(David 1985; Arthur 1989). Certain options may be blocked through lock-in effects; 
e.g., such actors may lack the incentives or ability to innovate in light of the constraints 
placed on them by the existing institutional context. Institutional complementarities 
19 We are indebted to Wolfgang Streeck and Robert Boyer for this observation.
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generate increasing returns among institutions and may lead to mutually reinforcing 
patterns of behavior. Thus, a central message of this literature has been to suggest that 
piecemeal borrowing of institutions may fail to generate the same sort of effi ciencies 
associated with the initial model (Streeck 1996), since practices or institutions may lack 
support from other complementary institutions. Likewise, fi rms in different countries 
facing common external challenges are likely to adapt in different ways due to the dif-
ferent constraints placed on them by their institutional contexts. Thus, while change 
may occur, adjustments would be largely “path dependent” ones that are unlikely to 
transform the overall institutional confi guration from one type of capitalism to another 
(Hall / Soskice 2001a).
Still, the same theoretical argument about complementary institutions might also sug-
gest the opposite. Namely, if a new practice or institution is established, the change 
would have a compounding effect on the surrounding institutions. Hollingsworth 
(1997: 267) claims, “In general, however, the institutions making up a social system 
of production are interdependent, and changes in one institution generally result in 
changes in other institutions.” Radical change would look like a collapsing house of 
cards, while incremental change would more closely resemble a slow erosion of other 
institutions (Lane 2003).
This competing imagery of institutional change points to theoretical ambivalence. It 
appears reasonable to argue that national capitalisms follow distinctive “paths” which 
evolve – in a general sense – from each country’s own historical legacy. However, should 
too much emphasis be placed on the coherence and complementarities among institu-
tions, the degree of stability could be overestimated (Crouch et al. 2005). In bi-polar 
typologies, such as in Hall and Soskice, only a very limited number of institutional 
combinations exist. Moreover, the strong foundation of their model in transaction cost 
economics means they see the different domains as relating to each other according to 
the same economic logic (e.g. coordination) and hence representing sets of mutually re-
inforcing alternatives. However, functional interdependence between various domains 
may relate to multiple dimensions of economic exchange (Crouch et al. 2005) and 
complementarities between domains that are subject to different political and social 
dynamics. Different institutional domains have their own unique logic (or Eigengesetz-
lichkeit following Max Weber) and thus evolve “historically” in the sense of being open 
to political contention and ideological reinterpretation.
These considerations have led to empirical work on the dynamics of national capitalisms 
by looking at their historical origins (Streeck / Yamamura 2001). By applying the logic 
of a “historical institutionalism” (Steinmo / Thelen 1992; Thelen 1999) to the analysis 
of national models, scholars have shown the broad types of capitalism to be far more 
dynamic than previously assumed. In particular, different capitalisms were not created 
as coherent wholes but were the result of political contention and often the unintended 
result of piecemeal development (Aoki 1997; Streeck / Yamamura 2001; Jackson / Vitols 
2001; Okazaki / Okuno-Fujiwara 1999). Likewise, recent studies of contemporary trans-
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formations of national capitalisms suggest a wide scope for “hybridization” – a dynamic 
mixing and matching of institutional elements that change the characteristic linkages 
and nature of complementarities between institutional elements (Jackson 2005a; Yama-
mura / Streeck 2003; Vogel 2003; Zeitlin 2000; Djelic 1998).
Emerging challenges and future research for varieties of capitalism
This paper has compared various comparative approaches to studying capitalism and 
argued that recent years have seen the emergence of a strong research agenda with a 
number of common characteristics. However, important unresolved debates exist with-
in this literature. This paper has argued that the way forward for the CC literature does 
not lie in choosing a particular typology or developing an alternative typology. Rather, 
further theoretical and empirical progress is more likely to come by developing a more 
dynamic view of individual institutions, the linkages between domains, and the role of 
politics and power. Five challenges, in particular, are central in this regard.
The fi rst and most important challenge is to explain and accommodate institutional 
change (Howell 2003). Approaches within the CC literature have typically been based 
on comparative statics. Indeed, the whole effort to describe and classify capitalism pre-
sumes institutional stability. The CC literature suggests a general view of path depen-
dence in which systems evolve in incremental fashion, reforms cannot wipe the slate 
clean, and fi rms adapt along certain lines within constraints. This is especially true for 
the Hall and Soskice (VoC) framework in which fi rm strategies, and thus their institu-
tional preferences, are endogenously derived (Allen 2004).20 An important implication 
is that foreign best practices cannot be easily imported to the degree that they confl ict 
with or lack the proper collective inputs from the institutional environment. Thus in-
stitutional complementarity is viewed as a central mechanism for limiting change. Al-
though it can be justifi able to assume general stability, institutions do change, and the 
last decade or so has seen considerable change in all systems of capitalism – so much so 
that the carefully developed typologies of the 1990s are being increasingly questioned. 
Some very recent work, such as Amable’s (2003), have attempted to build in a theory of 
institutional change, thus establishing a predictive framework for when and how some 
capitalist systems may shift from one category to another (or possibly develop into a 
new type of capitalism).
20 In a recent paper Hall and Thelen (2005) have attempted to overcome the static bias of the origi-
nal Hall and Soskice (2003) approach, in part by reconceptualizing institutions as “resources” 
that fi rms can choose among, thereby creating the possibility for change.
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The second challenge is the internationalization of economic activity and the expan-
sion of transnational institutions that affect such activity. The CC literature has hereto-
fore rested on the assumption that capitalism is most usefully segmented for analytical 
purposes into distinct economies bounded by the borders of nation states. The global 
economy consisted of various linkages (principally trade and capital fl ows) among 
these national units. But the reality of the global economy is rapidly moving away from 
this as micro-agents become more mobile, as competitive pressures encourage institu-
tional adaptation and harmonization across national units, and as new transnational 
institutions such as those of the European Union are constructed to integrate national 
economies. The future analytical utility of the CC literature will rest on how well it 
meets these challenges of institutional change and the growing transnationalization of 
capitalist activity and its institutions.
Third, signifi cant evidence exists to suggest that some national economies that have un-
dergone suffi cient institutional change no longer fi t into the category or “type” of capi-
talism to which they were ascribed during the 1980s or 1990s. In some cases this shift is 
quite radical (e.g. New Zealand, France), and a country can be convincingly moved to a 
different category of capitalism. There has also been considerable speculation that capi-
talisms characterized by extensive nonmarket institutions are especially vulnerable to 
erosion from general liberalization pressures (Yamamura / Streeck 2003; Goodin 2003). 
But generally the change of institutions presents a mixed picture and thus creates situ-
ations which leave the national political economy in an uneasy position between two 
or more categories (Molina / Rhodes 2006; Paunescu / Schneider 2004). Some national 
cases exhibit such far-ranging institutional change that they can be said to have trans-
formed to the point of belonging to a different subgroup, but not as far as belonging to 
a different type of capitalism altogether. The CC literature must meet this challenge by 
updating its typologies (partly to avoid conceptual overstretch) but also by establishing 
a theoretically-grounded approach for analyzing newer hybrid forms of capitalism.
The task of determining the type of capitalism to which a country belongs is compli-
cated further by the recognition that substantial functional change is hidden, in many 
instances, behind formal institutional stability (Gilson 2000; Streeck / Thelen 2005). This 
presents a fourth challenge for the CC literature, namely to recognize and theorize the 
formal stability that masks functional change. An (albeit contentious) example of this 
is the German system of codetermination. On the surface there is formal institutional 
continuity, but in practice the institutions of codetermination may have begun to serve 
different functions and purposes (Jackson 2005a; Rehder 2003). Similarly, national sys-
tems may exhibit formal institutional stability, but a growing body of research suggests 
that fi rms can pursue strategies that do not “fi t” well with the system logic (Hancké 
2002; Herrigel / Wittke 2005). Thus the same set of institutions can be “used” in different 
ways by the same actors, depending upon their changing preferences and needs (Mor-
gan 2005; Hall / Thelen 2005). In essence, a diversity of strategies within a single insti-
tutional setting appears possible in many instances. This suggests that the CC literature 
must accommodate a less “functionalist” view of institutions.
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Finally, a systematic inclusion of politics needs to be developed and included into theo-
ries of the formation and transformation of capitalist models. While politics has never 
been completely ignored in the literature, very recent work has begun to develop prom-
ising theories and a research agenda. This work has proceeded along three dimensions 
of politics. First, the role of partisanship is important. For example, Amable (2003) does 
a regression analysis showing that LMEs lean toward right party dominance and CMEs 
toward left. In contrast, several new and important works show a paradoxical but broad 
pattern of left parties promoting liberalization in fi nance and corporate governance in 
Europe (Cioffi  / Höpner 2005; Molina / Rhodes 2006). Second, political coalitions play 
an important role in shaping institutional change (Amable 2003; Gourevitch / Shinn 
2005; Hall / Thelen 2005; Deeg 2005c). Finally, political system characteristics have been 
increasingly incorporated into comparative analyses (Whitley 2005). Here there has 
been a trend to use the degree of power concentration in the system as the key analytic 
variable, i.e., the extent to which a political system exhibits a majoritarian or consensual 
character (Amable 2003; Gourevitch / Shinn 2005; Hall / Thelen 2005; Jackson 2005b; 
Molina / Rhodes 2006).
In sum, the CC literature constitutes a fruitful paradigm that has generated a broad set 
of testable hypotheses for understanding modern political economies. While it faces 
numerous challenges, it has developed the conceptual and theoretical rigor that makes 
a systematic research agenda both clear and feasible.
40 MPIfG Discussion Paper 06 / 2
References
Aglietta, Michel, 1979: A Theory of Capitalist Regulation: The US Experience. London: Verso.
Aguilera, Ruth V. / Gregory Jackson, 2003: The Cross-National Diversity of Corporate Governance: 
Dimensions and Determinants. In: Academy of Management Review XII, 1–19.
Albert, Michel, 1993: Capitalism vs. Capitalism: How America’s Obsession with Individual Achievement 
and Short-Term Profi t Has Led It to the Brink of Collapse. New York: Four Walls Eight Windows.
Allen, Matthew, 2004: The Varieties of Capitalism Paradigm: Not Enough Variety? In: Socio-Eco-
nomic Review 2, 87–108.
Amable, Bruno, 2003: The Diversity of Modern Capitalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Aoki, Masahiko, 1984: The Economic Analysis of the Japanese Firm. Contributions to Economic Anal-
ysis 151. Amsterdam: North-Holland.
 , 1997: Unintended Fit: Organizational Evolution and Government Design of Institutions in Ja-
pan. In: Masahiko Aoki / Hyung-Ki Kim / Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara (eds.), The Role of Govern-
ment in East Asian Economic Development: Comparative Institutional Analysis. Oxford: Claren-
don Press, 233–253.
 , 2001: Toward a Comparative Institutional Analysis. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Arthur, W. Brian, 1989: Competiting Technologies, Increasing Returns, and Lock-In by Historical 
Events. In: Economic Journal 99, 116–131.
Baglioni, Guido / Colin Crouch (eds.), 1990: European Industrial Relations: The Challenge of Flexibil-
ity. London: Sage.
Bamber, Greg J. / Russell D. Lansbury (eds.), 1998: International and Comparative Employment Rela-
tions. London: Sage.
Barney, James, 2001: Is the Resource-Based View a Useful Perspective for Strategic Management Re-
search? Yes. In: Academy of Management Review 26, 41–56.
Bean, Ron, 1994: Comparative Industrial Relations: An Introduction to Cross-National Perspectives. 
London: Routledge.
Becht, Marco / Ailsa Roel, 1999: Blockholding in Europe: An International Comparison. In: European 
Economic Review 43, 1049–1056.
Berger, Suzanne, 1981: Organizing Interests in Western Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Berger, Suzanne / Ronald Philip Dore, 1996: National Diversity and Global Capitalism. Cornell Studies 
in Political Economy. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Berglöf, Erik, 1991: Corporate Control and Capital Structure: Essays on Property Rights and Financial 
Contracts. Stockholm: Stockholm School of Economics, IIB Institute of International Business.
Beyer, Jürgen / Martin Höpner, 2003: The Disintegration of Organised Capitalism: German Corpo-
rate Governance in the 1990s. In: West European Politics 26, 179–198.
Biggart, Nicole Woolsey, 1991: Explaining Asian Economic Organization: Toward a Weberian Insti-
tutional Perspective. In: Theory and Society 20, 199–232.
Black, Stanley W. / Mathias Moersch, 1998: Financial Structure, Investment, and Economic Growth in 
OECD Countries. In: Stanley W. Black / Mathias Moersch (eds.), Competition of Convergence in 
Financial Markets: The German and Anglo-American Models. Amsterdam: Elsevier, 157–174.
Blair, Margaret M. / Mark J. Roe, 1999: Employees and Corporate Governance. Washington, D.C.: 
Brookings Institution Press.
Boyer, Robert (ed.), 1988: The Search for Labour Market Flexibility: The European Economies in Tran-
sition. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Boyer, Robert, 1997: French Statism at the Crossroads. In: Colin Crouch / Wolfgang Streeck (eds.), 
Political Economy of Modern Capitalism. London: Sage, 71–101.
 , 2003: The Embedded Innovation Systems of Germany and Japan: Distinctive Features and Fu-
tures. In: Kozo Yamamura / Wolfgang Streeck (eds.), The End of Diversity? Prospects for German 
and Japanese Capitalism. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 147–182.
Boyer, Robert 2004: New Growth Regimes, but Still Institutional Diversity. In: Socio-Economic Re-
view 2, 1–32.
Jackson, Deeg: How Many Varieties of Capitalism? 41
Boyer, Robert / Toshio Yamada, 2000: An Epochal Change … But Uncertain Futures: Japanese Capi-
talism in Crisis. A “Regulationist” Interpretation. CEPREMAP Discussion Paper, No. 2000–05. 
Paris: CEPREMAP.
Cameron, Rondo (ed.), 1972: Banking and Economic Development: Some Lessons of History. New 
York: Oxford University Press.
Castles, Francis G., 1995: Welfare State Development in Southern Europe. In: West European Politics 
18, 291–313.
Chandler, Alfred D., 1978: The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business. Cam-
bridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
 , 1990: Scale and Scope: The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Uni-
versity Press.
Cioffi , John W. / Martin Höpner, 2005: Mit Links in den Shareholder-Kapitalismus? In: Die Mitbestim-
mung 51, 16–19.
Coffee, John C., 2000: Convergence and Its Critics: What Are the Preconditions to the Separation of 
Ownership and Control? Center for Law and Economic Studies, Working Paper No. 179. New 
York: Columbia University, Columbia Law School, Center for Law and Economic Studies.
 , 2001: The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Role of Law in the Separation of Ownership and 
Control. Center for Law and Economic Studies, Working Paper No. 182. New York: Columbia 
University, Columbia Law School, Center for Law and Economic Studies.
Corbett, Jennifer / Tim Jenkinson, 1996: The Financing of Industry, 1970–1989: An International 
Comparison. In: Journal of the Japanese and International Economies 10, 71.
Crouch, Colin, 1993: Industrial Relations and European State Traditions. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
 , 2005: Capitalist Diversity and Change: Recombinant Governance and Institutional Entrepre-
neurs. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Crouch, Colin / David Finegold / Mari Sako, 1999: Are Skills the Answer? The Political Economy of Skill 
Creation in Advanced Industrial Economies. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Crouch, Colin / Wolfgang Streeck, 1997: Political Economy of Modern Capitalism: Mapping Conver-
gence and Diversity. London: Sage.
Crouch, Colin, et al., 2005: Dialogue on “Institutional Complementarity and Political Economy.” In: 
Socio-Economic Review 2, 359–382.
Dallago, Bruno, 2004: Comparative Economic Systems and the New Comparative Economics. In: 
The European Journal of Comparative Economics 1, 59–86.
David, Paul, 1985: Clio and the Economics of QWERTY. In: American Economic Review 75, 332–337.
De Jong, Henk W., 1996: European Capitalism Between Freedom and Social Justice. In: William 
Bratton et al. (eds.), International Regulatory Competition and Coordination: Perspectives on Eco-
nomic Regulation in Europe and the United States. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 185–206.
Deeg, Richard, 1999: Finance Capitalism Unveiled: Banks and the German Political Economy. Ann 
Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press.
 , 2005a: Change from Within: German and Italian Finance in the 1990s. In: Wolfgang 
Streeck / Kathleen Thelen (eds.), Beyond Continuity: Institutional Change in Advanced Political 
Economies. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
 , 2005b: The Comeback of Modell Deutschland? The New German Political Economy in the EU. 
In: German Politics 14, 332–353.
 , 2005c: Remaking Italian Capitalism? The Politics of Corporate Governance Reform. In: West 
European Politics 28, 521–548.
DiMaggio, Paul J. / Walter W. Powell, 1991: The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and 
Collective Rationality in Organization Fields. In: Walter W. Powell / Paul J. DiMaggio (eds.), The 
New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 63–82.
Djankov, Simeon, et al., 2003: The New Comparative Economics. In: Journal of Comparative Econom-
ics 31, 595–619.
Djelic, Marie-Laure, 1998: The Post-War Transformation of European Business. Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press.
42 MPIfG Discussion Paper 06 / 2
Dore, Ronald, 1973: British Factory, Japanese Factory: The Origins of National Diversity in Industrial 
Relations. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
 , 2000: Stock Market Capitalism: Welfare Capitalism: Japan and Germany vs. the Anglo-Saxons. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Ebbinghaus, Bernhard, 1999: Does a European Social Model Exist and Can It Survive? In: Gerhard 
Huemer / Michael Mesch / Franz Traxler (eds.), The Role of Employer Associations and Labour 
Unions in the EMU: Institutional Requirements for European Economic Policies. Aldershot: Ash-
gate, 1–26.
Ebbinghaus, Bernhard / Philip Manow (eds.), 2001: Comparing Welfare Capitalism: Social Policy and 
Political Economy in Europe, Japan and the USA. London: Routledge.
Ebbinghaus, Bernhard / Jelle Visser, 1997: Der Wandel der Arbeitsbeziehungen im westeuropäischen 
Vergleich. In: Stefan Hradil / Stefan Immerfall (eds.), Die westeuropäischen Gesellschaften im Ver-
gleich. Opladen: Leske + Budrich, 333–375.
Edwards, Jeremy / Klaus Fischer, 1994: Banks, Finance and Investment in Germany. Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press.
Elston, Julie A. / Horst Albach, 1995: Bank Affi liations and Firm Capital Investment in Germany. In: 
Ifo-Studien 41, 3–16.
Esping-Andersen, Gøsta, 1990: The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Ferrera, Maurizio, 1996: The “Southern Model” of Welfare in Social Europe. In: Journal of European 
Social Policy 6, 17–37.
Fligstein, Neil, 1990: The Transformation of Corporate Control. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press.
Fligstein, Neil / Robert Freeland, 1995: Theoretical and Comparative Perspectives on Corporate Gov-
ernance. In: Annual Review of Sociology 21, 21.
Gerschenkron, Alexander, 1966: Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective. Cambridge, MA: 
Belknap.
Gilson, Ronald J., 2000: The Globalization of Corporate Governance: Convergence of Form or Function. 
Center for Law and Economic Studies, Working Paper No. 192. New York: Columbia University, 
Columbia Law School, Center for Law and Economic Studies.
Goldthorpe, John H. (ed.), 1984: Order and Confl ict in Contemporary Capitalism. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press.
Goodin, Robert E., 2003: Choose Your Capitalism? In: Comparative European Politics 1, 203–213.
Gould, Arthur, 1993: Capitalist Welfare Systems: A Comparison of Japan, Britain, and Sweden. Lon-
don: Longman.
Gourevitch, Peter A. / James Shinn, 2005: Political Power and Corporate Control: The New Global Poli-
tics of Corporate Governance Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Granovetter, Mark, 1985: Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness. In: 
American Journal of Sociology 91, 481.
Gras, N.S.B., 1939 (1971): Business and Capitalism: An Introduction to Business History. New York: 
Augustus M. Kelley Publishers.
Hall, Peter A. / Daniel W. Gingerich, 2004: Varieties of Capitalism and Institutional Complementari-
ties in the Macroeconomy. MPIfG Discussion Paper 04/5. Cologne: Max Planck Institute for the 
Study of Societies.
Hall, Peter A. / David Soskice, 2001a: An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism. In: Peter A. Hall / Da-
vid Soskice (eds.), Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advan-
tage. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1–70.
 , 2001b: Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage. Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press.
 , 2003: Varieties of Capitalism and Institutional Change: A Response to Three Critics. In: Com-
parative European Politics 1, 241–250.
Hall, Peter A. / Kathleen Thelen, 2005: The Politics of Change in Varieties of Capitalism. Conference 
paper. American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, September 1–4, 2005, Washing-
ton, D.C.
Jackson, Deeg: How Many Varieties of Capitalism? 43
Hancké, Bob, 2002: Large Firms and Institutional Change: Industrial Renewal and Economic Restruc-
turing in France. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Herrigel, Gary, 1996: Industrial Constructions: The Sources of German Industrial Power. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
Herrigel, Gary / Volker Wittke, 2005: Varieties of Vertical Disintegration: The Global Trend Toward 
Heterogenous Supply Relations and the Reproduction of Difference in US and German Manu-
facturing. In: Glenn Morgan / Richard Whitley / Eli Moen (eds.), Changing Capitalisms? Inter-
nationalization, Institutional Change, and Systems of Economic Organization. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.
Hilferding, Rudolf, [1910] 2000: Das Finanzkapital. Eine Studie über die jüngste Entwicklung des Kapi-
talismus. Faksimile der 1910 in Wien erschienenen Erstausgabe. Reihe: Klassiker der National-
ökonomie. Stuttgart: Schäffer-Poeschel.
 , 1924: Probleme der Zeit. In: Die Gesellschaft 1, 1–17.
Hollingsworth, J. Rogers, 1997: Continuities and Changes in Social Systems of Production: The Cases 
of Japan, Germany, and the United States. In: J. Rogers Hollingsworth / Robert Boyer (eds.), 
Contemporary Capitalism: The Embeddedness of Institutions. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 265–310.
Hollingsworth, J. Rogers / Robert Boyer, 1997a: Contemporary Capitalism: The Embeddedness of Insti-
tutions. Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
 , 1997b: Coordination of Economic Actors and Social Systems of Production. In: J. Rogers Hol-
lingsworth / Robert Boyer (eds.), Contemporary Capitalism: The Embeddedness of Institutions. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1–47.
Hollingsworth, J. Rogers / Philippe C. Schmitter / Wolfgang Streeck, 1994: Governing Capitalist Econo-
mies. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hollingsworth, J. Rogers / Wolfgang Streeck, 1994: Countries and Sectors. Concluding Remarks on 
Performance, Convergence, and Competitiveness. In: J. Rogers Hollingsworth / Philippe C. 
Schmitter / Wolfgang Streeck (eds.), Governing Capitalist Economies: Performance and Control of 
Economic Sectors. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 270–300.
Höpner, Martin, 2003: Sozialdemokratie, Gewerkschaften, und organisierter Kapitalismus, 1880–
2002. In: Roland Czada / Reinhard Zintl (Hrsg.), Politik und Markt. Politische Vierteljahres-
schrift, Sonderheft 34. Wiesbaden: VS-Verlag, 300–324.
Hoshi, Takeo, 1994: The Economic Role of Corporate Grouping and the Main Bank System. In: Ma-
sahiko Aoki / Ronald Dore (eds.), The Japanese Firm: The Source of Competitive Strength. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 285–309.
Howell, Chris, 2003: Varieties of Capitalism: And Then There was One? In: Comparative Politics 36, 
103–124.
Jackson, Gregory, 2001: The Origins of Nonliberal Corporate Governance in Germany and Japan. In: 
Wolfgang Streeck / Kozo Yamamura (eds.), The Origins of Nonliberal Capitalism: Germany and 
Japan in Comparison. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 121–170.
 , 2005a: Contested Boundaries: Ambiguity and Creativity in the Evolution of German Codeter-
mination. In: Wolfgang Streeck / Kathleen Thelen (eds.), Beyond Continuity: Explorations in the 
Dynamics of Advanced Political Economies. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
 , 2005b: Employee Representation in the Board Compared: A Fuzzy Sets Analysis of Corporate 
Governance, Unionism, and Political Institutions. In: Industrielle Beziehungen 12, 1–28.
 , 2005c: Stakeholders under Pressure: Corporate Governance and Labour Management in Ger-
many and Japan. In: Corporate Governance: An International Review 13, 419–428.
Jackson, Gregory / Sigurt Vitols, 2001: Between Financial Commitment, Market Liquidity and Corpo-
rate Governance: Occupational Pensions in Britain, Germany, Japan and the USA. In: Bernhard 
Ebbinghaus / Philip Manow (eds.), Comparing Welfare Capitalism: Social Policy and Political 
Economy in Europe, Japan and the USA. London: Routledge, 171–189.
Katzenstein, Peter, 1985: Small States in World Markets. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Kelly, Gavin / Dominic Kelly / Andrew Gamble, 1997: Stakeholder Capitalism. Houndmills, Basing-
stoke: Macmillan Press.
44 MPIfG Discussion Paper 06 / 2
Kenworthy, Lane, 2006: Institutional Coherence and Macroeconomic Performance. In: Socio-Eco-
nomic Review 4, 69–91.
Kern, Horst / Michael Schumann, 1984: Das Ende der Arbeitsteilung: Rationalisierung in der industriel-
len Produktion. München: Beck.
Kitschelt, Herbert, 1991: Industrial Governance Structures, Innovation Strategies, and the Case of 
Japan: Sectoral or Cross-National Comparative Analysis? In: International Organization 45, 
453–493.
Kurzer, Paulette, 1993: Business and Banking: Political Change and Economic Integration in Europe. 
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
La Porta, Rafael, 1999: Investor Protection: Origins, Consequences, Reform. NBER Working Paper No. 
7428. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research.  
<http: / / www.nber.org / papers / w7428.pdf>
 , et al., 1998: Law and Finance. In: Journal of Political Economy 106, 1113–1155.
La Porta, Rafael / Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes / Andrei Shleifer, 1999: Corporate Ownership Around 
the World. In: Journal of Finance 54, 471–517.
Lane, Christel, 1993: Management and Labour in Europe: The Industrial Enterprise in Germany, Brit-
ain and France. Aldershot, UK: Edward Elgar.
  1995: Industry and Society in Europe: Stability and Change in Britain, Germany and France. Al-
dershot, UK: Edward Elgar.
 , 2003: Changes in Corporate Governance of German Corporations: Convergence to the Anglo-
American Model? In: Competition and Change 7, 79–100.
Leibenstein, Harvey, 1966: Allocative Effi ciency vs. X-Effi ciency. In: American Economic Review 66, 
392–415.
Leibfried, Stephen, 1994: Sozialstaat oder Wohlfahrtsgesellschaft: Thesen zu einem japanisch-
deutschen Sozialpolitikvergleich. In: Soziale Welt 45, 389–410.
Lepsius, M. Rainer, 1990: Interessen, Ideen und Institutionen. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag.
Lundvall, Bengt-Åke (ed.), 1992: National Systems of Innovation: Towards a Theory of Innovation and 
Interactive Learning. London: Pinter.
Maher, Maria / Thomas Andersson, 1999: Corporate Governance: Effects on Firm Performance and Eco-
nomic Growth. Conference paper. Conference “Convergence and Diversity in Corporate Gover-
nance Regimes and Capital Markets,” Eindhoven, Netherlands, November 4–5, 1999.
Mares, Isabela, 2003: The Politics of Social Risk: Business and Welfare State Development. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
Maurice, Marc / Francios Sellier / Jean-Jacques Silvestre, 1986: The Social Foundations of Industrial 
Power: A Comparison of France and Germany. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Milgrom, Paul R. / John Roberts, 1990: Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with 
Strategic Complementarities. In: Econometrica 58, 1255–1278.
 , 1992: Economics, Organization, and Management. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
 , 1994: Complementarities and Systems: Understanding Japanese Economic Organization. In: 
Estudios Económicos 9, 3–42.
 , 1995: Complementarities, Industrial Strategy, Structure, and Change in Manufacturing. In: 
Journal of Accounting and Economics 19, 179–208.
Molina, Oscar / Martin Rhodes, 2006: Confl ict, Complementarities and Institutional Change in 
Mixed Market Economies. In: Bob Hancké / Martin Rhodes / M. Thatcher (eds.), Beyond Varieties 
of Capitalism: Contradictions, Complementarities & Change. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Morgan, Glenn, 1997: Financial Security, Welfare Regimes, and the Governance of Work Systems. 
In: Richard Whitley / Peer Hull Kristensen (eds.), Governance at Work: The Social Regulation of 
Economic Relations. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 104–122.
Nelson, Richard R., 1987: Understanding Technical Change as an Evolutionary Process. Amsterdam: 
North-Holland.
  (ed.), 1993: National Innovation Systems: A Comparative Analysis. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
O’Sullivan, Mary, 2000: Contests for Corporate Control: Corporate Governance and Economic Perfor-
mance in the United States and Germany. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Jackson, Deeg: How Many Varieties of Capitalism? 45
Okazaki, Tetsuji / Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara (eds.), 1999: The Japanese Economic System and its His-
torical Origins. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Orru, Marco / Nicole Woolsey Biggart / Gary G. Hamilton, 1997: The Economic Organization of East 
Asian Capitalism. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Parkinson, John / Gavin Kelly, 2001: The Conceptual Foundations of the Firm. In: John Parkin-
son / Andrew Gamble / Gavin Kelly (eds.), The Political Economy of the Company. Oxford, UK: 
Hart Publishing, 113–140.
Paunescu, Mihai / Martin Schneider, 2004: Wettbewerbsfähigkeit und Dynamik institutioneller Stan-
dortbedingungen: Ein empirischer Test des “Varieties of Capitalism”-Ansatzes. Trier: University 
of Trier.
Piore, Michael J. / Charles F. Sabel, 1984: The Second Industrial Divide: Possibilities for Prosperity. New 
York: Basic Books.
Pontusson, Jonas, 1997: Between Neo-Liberalism and the German Model: Swedish Capitalism in 
Transition. In: Colin Crouch / Wolfgang Streeck (eds.), Political Economy of Modern Capitalism: 
Mapping Convergence and Diversity. London: Sage, 55–70.
Porter, Michael E., 1990: The Competitive Advantage of Nations. New York, NY: The Free Press.
Powell, Walter W., 1991: Neither Market nor Hierarchy: Network Forms of Organization. In: Gra-
hame Thompson et al. (eds.), Markets, Hierarchies, and Networks. London: Sage.
Regini, Marino, 1997: Social Institutions and Production Structure: The Italian Variety of Capitalism 
in the 1980s. In: Colin Crouch / Wolfgang Streeck (eds.), Political Economy of Modern Capitalism: 
Mapping Convergence and Diversity. London: Sage, 102–116.
Rehder, Britta, 2003: Betriebliche Bündnisse für Arbeit in Deutschland: Mitbestimmung und Flächen-
tarif im Wandel. Frankfurt a.M.: Campus.
Rhodes, Martin / Bastiaan van Apeldoorn, 1997: Capitalism vs. Capitalism in Western Europe. In: 
Martin Rhodes / Paul Heywood / Vincent Wright (eds.), Developments in West European Politics. 
London: St. Martin’s Press.
Roberts, John, 2004: The Modern Firm. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Roe, Mark J., 1994: Strong Managers, Weak Owners: The Political Roots of American Corporate Finance. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
 , 2000: Comparative Corporate Governance Palgrave Dictionary of Law and Economics. Working 
Paper No. 125. New York: Center for Law and Economic Studies. Columbia University School 
of Law.
 , 2003: Political Determinants of Corporate Governance: Political Context, Corporate Impact. Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press.
Roy, William G., 1997: Socializing Capital: The Rise of the Large Industrial Corporation in America. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Rueda, D. / Jonus Pontusson, 2000: Wage Inequality and Varieties of Capitalism. In: World Politics 52, 
350–383.
Scharpf, Fritz, 1987: Crisis and Choice in European Social Democracy. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
 , 1988: Game-Theoretical Interpretations of Infl ation and Unemployment in Western Europe. 
In: Journal of Public Policy 7(3), 227–257.
Scharpf, Fritz / Vivien A. Schmidt (eds.), 2000a: Welfare and Work in the Open Economy, Vol. 2: Diverse 
Responses to Common Challenges. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  (eds.), 2000b: Welfare and Work in the Open Economy, Vol. 1: From Vulnerability to Competitive-
ness. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Schmidt, Vivien A., 2000: Still Three Models of Capitalism? The Dynamics of Economic Adjustment 
in Britain, Germany, and France. In: Roland Czada / Susanne Lütz (eds.), Die politische Konstruk-
tion von Märkten. Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag, 38–72.
 , 2002: The Futures of European Capitalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Schmitter, Philippe C. / Gerhard Lehmbruch (eds.), 1979: Trends toward Corporatist Intermediation. 
Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications.
Shonfi eld, Andrew, 1965: Modern Capitalism: The Changing Balance of Public and Private Power. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
46 MPIfG Discussion Paper 06 / 2
Sorge, Arndt, 1991: Strategic Fit and the Societal Effect: Interpreting Cross-national Comparisons of 
Technology, Organization and Human Resources. In: Organization Studies 12, 161–190.
Sorge, Arndt, 1999: Organizing Societal Space within Globalization: Bringing Society Back In. MPIfG 
Working Paper 99 / 10. Cologne: Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.
Sorge, Arndt / Wolfgang Streeck, 1988: Industrial Relations and Technical Change: The Case for an 
Extended Perspective. In: Richard Hyman / Wolfgang Streeck (eds.), New Technology and Indus-
trial Relations. Oxford: Blackwell, 19–47.
Sorge, Arndt / Malcom Warner, 1986: Comparative Factory Organization: An Anglo-German Compari-
son of Manufacturing, Management and Manpower. Aldershot: Gower.
Soskice, David, 1996: German Technology Policy, Innovation, and National Institutional Frameworks. 
WZB Discussion Paper FS 1 96 – 319. Berlin: Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung.
 , 1999: Divergent Production Regimes: Coordinated and Uncoordinated Market Economies in 
the 1980s and 1990s. In: Herbert Kitschelt et al. (eds.), Continuity and Change in Contemporary 
Capitalism. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 101–134.
Soskice, David / David Finegold, 1988: Britain’s Failure to Train: Explanations and Possible Strategies. 
In: Oxford Review of Economic Policy 4(3), 21–53.
Stark, David, 2001: Ambiguous Assets for Uncertain Environments: Heterarchy in Postsocialist 
Firms. In: Paul DiMaggio (ed.), The Twenty-First-Century Firm: Changing Economic Organiza-
tion in International Perspective. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 69–104.
Stark, David / László Bruszt, 1998: Postsocialist Pathways: Transforming Politics and Property in East 
Central Europe. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Steinmo, Sven / Kathleen Ann Thelen, 1992: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics. In: 
Sven Steinmo / Kathleen Ann Thelen / Frank Longstreth (eds.), Structuring Politics: Historical In-
stitutionalism in Comparative Analysis. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1–32.
Streeck, Wolfgang, 1992a: Productive Constraints: On the Institutional Conditions of Diversifi ed 
Quality Production. In: Wolfgang Streeck (ed.), Social Instititions and Economic Performance. 
London: Sage, 1–40.
 , 1992b: Social Institutions and Economic Performance: Studies of Industrial Relations in Advanced 
Capitalist Economies. London: Sage.
 , 1996: Lean Production in the German Automobile Industry: A Test Case for Convergence The-
ory. In: Suzanne Berger / Ronald Dore (eds.), National Diversity and Global Capitalism. Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press, 138–170.
 , 1997: Benefi cial Constraints: On the Economic Limits of Rational Voluntarism. In: J. Rogers 
Hollingsworth / Robert Boyer (eds.), Contemporary Capitalism: The Embeddedness of Institutions. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 197–219.
 , 2001: Introduction: Explorations into the Origins of Nonliberal Capitalisms in Germany and 
Japan. In: Wolfgang Streeck / Kozo Yamamura (eds.), The Origins of Nonliberal Capitalism: Ger-
many and Japan Compared. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Streeck, Wolfgang / Philippe C. Schmitter (eds.), 1985: Private Interest Government: Beyond Market 
and State. London: Sage.
Streeck, Wolfgang / Kathleen Thelen (eds.), 2005: Beyond Continuity: Explorations in the Dynamics of 
Advanced Political Economies. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Streeck, Wolfgang / Kozo Yamamura, 2001: The Origins of Nonliberal Capitalism: Germany and Japan 
in Comparison. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Thelen, Kathleen, 1999: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics. In: American Review of 
Political Science, 369–404.
 , 2004: How Institutions Evolve: The Political Economy of Skills in Germany, Britain, the United 
States and Japan. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Verdier, Daniel, 2001: Capital Mobility and the Origins of Stock Markets. In: International Organiza-
tion 55, 327–356.
Visser, Jelle / Anton Hemerijck, 1997: A Dutch Miracle: Job Growth, Welfare Reform and Corporatism 
in the Netherlands. Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam Press.
Jackson, Deeg: How Many Varieties of Capitalism? 47
Vitols, Sigurt, 1996: Modernizing Capital: Banks and the Regulation of Long-Term Finance in Postwar 
Germany and the U.S. Dissertation thesis. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin-Madison.
 , 2001: The Origins of Bank-Based and Market-Based Financial Systems: Germany, Japan, and 
the United States. In: Wolfgang Streeck / Kozo Yamamura (eds.), The Origins of Nonliberal Capi-
talism: Germany and Japan in Comparison. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Vitols, Sigurt, 2004: Negotiated Shareholder Value: The German Version of an Anglo-American Prac-
tice. In: Competition and Change 8, 1–18.
Vogel, Steven K., 2003: The Reorganization of Organized Capitalism: How the German and Japanese 
Models Are Shaping Their Own Transformation. In: Kozo Yamamura / Wolfgang Streeck (eds.), 
The End of Diversity? Prospects for German and Japanese Capitalism. Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univer-
sity Press, 306–333.
Wallerstein, Immanual, 1979: The Capitalist World-Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Weber, Max, 1978: Economy and Society. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
Whitley, Richard, 1992: Business Systems in East Asia: Firms, Markets and Societies. London: Sage.
 , 1999: Divergent Capitalisms: The Social Structuring and Change of Business Systems. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press.
 , 2005: How National are Business Systems? The Role of States and Complementary Institutions 
in Standardizing Systems of Economic Coordination and Control at the National Level. In: 
Glenn Morgan / Richard Whitley / Eli Moen (eds.), Changing Capitalisms? Internationalization, 
Institutional Change, and Systems of Economic Organization. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Williamson, Oliver E., 1975: Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Anti-Trust Implications. New York, 
NY: Free Press.
 , 1991: Comparative Economic Organization: Analysis of Discrete Structural Alternatives. In: 
Administrative Science Quarterly 36, 269–296.
Yamamura, Kozo / Wolfgang Streeck (eds.), 2003: The End of Diversity? Prospects of German and Japa-
nese Capitalism. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Zachary Taylor, Mark, 2004: Empirical Evidence Against Varieties of Capitalism’s Theory of Techni-
cal Innovation. In: International Organization 58, 601–631.
Zeitlin, Johnathan, 2000: Introduction: Americanization and Its Limits: Reworking US Technology 
and Management in Post-War Europe and Japan. In: Johnathan Zeitlin / Gary Herrigel (eds.), 
Americanization and Its Limits: Reworking US Technology and Management in Post-War Europe 
and Japan. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1–52.
Zysman, John, 1983: Governments, Markets, and Growth: Financial Systems and the Politics of Indus-
trial Change. Cornell Studies in Political Economy. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Recent Titles in the Publication Series of the MPIfG
MPIfG Discussion Papers
DP 06 / 1
N. Bandelj
Cultural Understandings of 
Economic Globalization:
Discourse on Foreign Direct 
Investment in Slovenia
DP 05 / 14
R. Mayntz
Embedded Theorizing:
Perspectives on Globalization 
and Global Governance
DP 05 / 13
G. Möllering
Understanding Trust from the 
Perspective of Sociological 
Neoinstitutionalism:
The Interplay of Institutions 
and Agency
DP 05 / 12
C. Woll
The Diffi cult Organization of 
Business Interests:
MEDEF and the Political 
Representation of French Firms
DP 05 / 11
P. Manow
National Vote Intention and 
European Voting Behavior, 
1979–2004:
Second Order Effects, Election 
Timing, Government Approval 
and the Europeanization of 
European Elections
DP 05 / 10
P. Aspers
Status Markets and Standard 
Markets in the Global Garment 
Industry
MPIfG Working Papers
WP 06 / 1
S. Ganghof
The Politics of Tax Structure





WP 05 / 9
Aurora Trif
Collective Bargaining Practices 
in Eastern Europe: Case Study 
Evidence from Romania
WP 05 / 8
F. W. Scharpf
No Exit from the Joint Decision 
Trap? Can German Federalism 
Reform Itself?
WP 05 / 7
A. Trif, K. Koch
Strategic Unionism in Eastern 
Europe: The Case of Romania
WP 05 / 6
F. W. Scharpf
Recht und Politik in der Reform 
des deutschen Föderalismus
WP 05 / 5
W. Streeck
Vom „kurzen Traum“ zum 
langen Alptraum?
WP 05 / 4
W. Streeck
Nach dem Korporatismus: 
Neue Eliten, neue Konfl ikte
MPIfG Books
W. Streeck, J. Grote, 
V. Schneider, J. Visser (eds.)
Governing Interests:
Business Associations Facing 
Internationalization
Routledge, 2006
J. Beckert, M. Zafi rovski (eds.)




The Reform of Bismarckian 
Pension Systems:
A Comparison of Pension 
Politics in Austria, France, 
Germany, Italy and Sweden







G. Falkner, O. Treib, 
M. Hartlapp, S. Leiber
Complying with Europe: 
EU Harmonisation and Soft 
Law in the Member States










Order printed copies from the MPIfG (you will be 
billed) or download PDF fi le from the MPIfG website 
(free).
MPIfG Working Papers
Online at the MPIfG website.
MPIfG Books




Consult our website for the most complete and up-
to-date information about MPIfG publications and 
publications by MPIfG researchers. To sign up for 
newsletters and mailings, please go to Service on the 
MPIfG website. Upon request to info@mpifg.de, we 
will be happy to send you our Recent Publications 
brochure.
ERPA
MPIfG Discussion Papers and MPIfG Working Papers 
in the fi eld of European integration research are 
included in the European Research Papers Archive 
(ERPA) which offers full-text search options:  
http: / / eiop.or.at / erpa.
